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Abstract 
 Mutual assistance clauses serve a dual purpose. They commit their signatories 
to stand up to a common threat and are thereby meant to deter potential aggressors. 
Their dual purpose places them at the crossroads between war and peace and the 
intersection between law and strategy. The rise of hybrid threats, however, has led 
many to question whether the mutual assistance guarantees found in the North 
Atlantic and EU Treaties remain suited for our present security environment. 
Adversaries employ tactics that increasingly seem to blur the dividing line between 
war and peace. The hybridization of warfare thus poses a risk that adversaries may 
circumvent classic security guarantees. The purpose of the present Article is to 
compare the mutual assistance clauses of the North Atlantic and EU Treaties to 
determine their scope of application, clarify the nature and extent of the obligations 
they impose on the contracting parties, and assess their vulnerability to hybrid threats. 
The analysis confirms that the provisions in question are at risk of subversion, but 
that the impact of this threat is more limited than is often assumed. Nevertheless, this 
Article argues that there is no room for complacency. NATO, the EU, and their 
member states should take steps to strengthen legal interoperability in order to 
increase the legal resilience of their collective security arrangements against the 
challenges posed by hybrid threats. 
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I. Introduction 
 The return of a more confrontational strategic environment in Europe has 
sparked renewed interest in the mutual assistance clauses of the North Atlantic and 
the EU Treaties.1 Recent events have prompted commentators to question whether 
Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty (NAT) remains an effective safeguard against 
contemporary security challenges.2 Many are concerned that Article 5 is too blunt 
an instrument in an era of hybrid threats. Potential adversaries increasingly combine 
conventional capabilities with more elusive methods of exercising their influence, 
ranging from disinformation campaigns and election meddling to cyber attacks and 
the deployment of “little green men.”3 Faced with such tactics, William Hague, the 
former British Secretary of State, has argued that NATO needs a new concept of 
“attack” and “defense,” as well as a new treaty article to “make clear that the use 
of a hybrid and undeclared attack would trigger a collective response from the 
Alliance.”4 In parallel to these developments, the Transatlantic relationship has 
entered a period of turbulence, raising doubts about the Trump Administration’s 
enthusiasm to uphold the collective self-defense commitment under Article 5.5 This 
in turn has revived support in some capitals for deepening the process of European 
security and defense integration.6 
Against this background, the purpose of this Article is to assess whether the 
mutual assistance guarantees embodied in Article 5 NAT, Article 42(7) of the 
Treaty on European Union (TEU), and Article 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union (TFEU) remain fit for purpose in the light of hybrid threats. 
                                                 
1 North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 244 [hereinafter NAT]; 
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 13 
[hereinafter TEU]; Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 
May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47 [hereinafter TFEU]. 
2 See, e.g., James Goldgeier, NATO’s Charter: Adaptable but Limited, in CHARTER OF THE NORTH 
ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION: TOGETHER WITH SCHOLARLY COMMENTARIES AND ESSENTIAL 
HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS 288, 299 (Ian Shapiro & Adam Tooze eds., 2018). 
3 On the notion of hybrid warfare and hybrid threats, see generally HYBRID WARFARE: FIGHTING 
COMPLEX OPPONENTS FROM THE ANCIENT WORLD TO THE PRESENT (Williamson Murray & Peter 
R. Mansoor eds., 2012); NATO’S RESPONSE TO HYBRID THREATS (Guillaume Lasconjarias & 
Jeffrey A. Larsen eds., 2015); COUNTERING HYBRID THREATS: LESSONS LEARNED FROM UKRAINE 
(Niculae Iancu et. al eds., 2016); OFER FRIDMAN, RUSSIAN “HYBRID WARFARE”: RESURGENCE AND 
POLITICIZATION (2018). 
4 William Hague, NATO must confront Putin’s stealth attacks with a new doctrine of war of its own, 
THE TELEGRAPH (Mar. 19, 2018); see also Khatuna Burkadze, A Shift in NATO's Article 5 in the 
Cyber Era, 42 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 215, 226 (2018); Dave Weinstein, Snowden and U.S. 
Cyber Power, GEO. J. INT’L AFF. 4, 10 (2014). 
5 Scott R. Anderson, Saving NATO, LAWFARE (July 15, 2018), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/saving-nato [https://perma.cc/UD58-495U]. 
6 Heiko Maas, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Germany, Speech: Courage to Stand Up for Europe – 
#EuropeUnited (June 13, 2018), https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/maas-
europeunited/2106528 [https://perma.cc/DP9J-A3MU]; Emmanuel Macron, Dear Europe, Brexit is 
a lesson for all of us: it’s time for renewal, GUARDIAN (Mar. 4, 2019), 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/mar/04/europe-brexit-uk 
[https://perma.cc/APG5-FE3B]; see also Simon Duke, The Enigmatic Role of Defence in the EU: 
From EDC to EDU?, 23 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 63, 69–74 (2018). 
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Such an analysis is timely for several reasons. NATO and the EU are rules-based 
organizations.7 The mutual assistance clauses set out in their founding instruments 
form a key part of the normative framework that conditions their response to current 
security challenges. It is not uncommon, however, for commentators to question 
the scope of the obligations imposed by these clauses and to cast doubt on their 
binding effect.8 This Article sets out to clarify the extent of these commitments and 
their legal nature. Since approximately two-thirds of the membership of NATO and 
the EU overlaps,9 the Article adopts a comparative approach to assess how far the 
three provisions may complement one another. In doing so, it also investigates their 
limitations. States employ law and legal arguments as an instrument to pursue their 
strategic interests.10 It should be expected that future adversaries will attempt to 
exploit any deficiencies in the Transatlantic and European security guarantees as 
part of a hybrid approach to warfighting.11 The Article therefore seeks to determine 
to what extent the three mutual assistance clauses are vulnerable to subversive 
tactics. 
 The NAT is a comparatively short agreement—a “simple document” as 
U.S. President Harry Truman put it—consisting of a preamble and fourteen 
articles.12 Among these, Article 5 NAT is widely seen as the cornerstone of the 
Treaty and of the Alliance itself.13 By contrast, Article 42(7) TEU and Article 222 
TFEU form part of a more elaborate legal and policy framework that has evolved 
gradually over a number of decades.14 For our purposes, these three provisions are 
best compared along two axes: the circumstances which engage the duty of mutual 
assistance and the scope of the obligations they impose on the contracting parties. 
Accordingly, this Article proceeds in three steps. 
 Section II reviews the conditions that trigger the application of the 
Transatlantic and European mutual assistance clauses. It shows that Article 5 NAT 
and Article 42(7) TEU are engaged in the same, or virtually identical, 
                                                 
7 NAT, supra note 1, preamble (“[The Parties] are determined to safeguard the freedom, common 
heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty 
and the rule of law.”); TEU, supra note 1, art. 2 (“The Union is founded on the values of respect for 
. . . the rule of law . . . .”). 
8 See, e.g., Michael J. Glennon, United States Mutual Security Treaties: The Commitment Myth, 24 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 509, 544–52 (1986); Zbigniew Brzezinski, An Agenda for NATO: 
Toward a Global Security, 88 FOREIGN AFF. 2, 15 (2009). 
9 Twenty-two nations are members of both organizations. 
10 For recent work on this subject, see Ian Hurd, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(2017); Monica Hakimi, The Work of International Law, 58 HARV. INT’L. L. J. 1 (2017). 
11 Aurel Sari, Hybrid Warfare, Law and the Fulda Gap, in COMPLEX BATTLESPACES: THE LAW OF 
ARMED CONFLICT AND THE DYNAMICS OF MODERN WARFARE 161 (Christopher M. Ford & Winston 
S. Williams eds., 2019). 
12 ADDRESS OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, 20 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, PUB. NO. 511, 481 
(1949). 
13 Press Release, NATO, Declaration on Alliance Security Issued by the Heads of State and 
Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Strasbourg/Kehl (Apr. 4, 
2009); see also SHERROD LEWIS BUMGARDNER ET AL., NATO LEGAL DESK BOOK 72 (2010). 
14 See PANOS KOUTRAKOS, THE EU COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY 5–21 (2013); 
MARTIN TRYBUS, EUROPEAN UNION LAW AND DEFENCE INTEGRATION (2005). 
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circumstances of an armed attack or an act of armed aggression. These two 
provisions therefore mostly overlap in their scope of application. This opens up the 
possibility that they could serve as a fallback option to each other. By contrast, 
Article 222 TFEU may apply in a broader range of circumstances, but it is subject 
to a gravity threshold which reduces its utility. Section III compares the mutual 
commitments undertaken by the contracting parties. It demonstrates that they entail 
legal obligations and not merely political pledges, as is often assumed. All three 
provisions require the contracting parties to consider providing both military and 
non-military forms of assistance to each other. However, the analysis reveals that 
the parties remain free to choose the most appropriate means of assistance. Section 
IV places these findings within the current security context. It confirms that the 
Transatlantic and European mutual assistance guarantees are in fact vulnerable to 
the strategies of subversion and erosion associated with hybrid threats, but suggests 
that the impact of this vulnerability is misunderstood and overrated. Calls to revise 
Article 5 and Article 42(7) fail to appreciate that this step would not resolve the 
legal and policy challenges associated with their implementation. This Article 
therefore argues that increasing legal interoperability among NATO and EU nations 
on the basis of the existing legal frameworks offers the best prospect for countering 
the challenges presented by hybrid threats. 
II. Casus Foederis 
 Mutual assistance clauses serve two core functions. They express in formal 
terms a commitment by their signatories to assist each other in the face of common 
danger. They also send a message to any would-be aggressor that certain hostile 
actions will be met with a unified response. They are, in other words, a promise and 
a warning. Their aim is to compel action by their signatories and to deter aggressive 
behavior by third parties.15 
 These twin functions give rise to competing considerations that pull mutual 
assistance clauses in opposite directions. The circumstances that trigger their 
application must be defined in a way that leaves the signatories in no doubt as to 
when their duty of mutual help has been engaged. Clarity is also needed to 
accomplish the deterrent effect. Aggressors must be told in unmistakable terms 
what action will not be tolerated.16 These considerations call for precision, detail, 
and completeness. Yet too much of these qualities may be counterproductive. Red 
lines, if not enforced, may undermine the credibility of an alliance. Drawing clear 
lines also signals to an adversary what action it is likely to get away with 
unopposed. In fact, they may induce an aggressor to engage in hostile activities 
below the threshold that would trigger a united reaction by the allies. The 
contracting parties therefore may well desire to retain a degree of ambiguity and 
                                                 
15 Cf. Minutes of the Twelfth Meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security (Feb. 8, 
1949), in 4 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1949, WESTERN EUROPE, 73, 81 (1974) 
[hereinafter FRUS VOL. IV] (“The Pact should serve both as a deterrent against aggression and as a 
means of bringing about collective action to restore order should an attack occur.”). 
16 THOMAS C. SCHELLING, ARMS AND INFLUENCE 35–36 (2008). 
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terminological laxness.17 This could also provide them with room to adopt a more 
flexible response to acts of aggression.18 It may even encourage adversaries to 
exercise greater caution for fear of provoking a robust allied reaction.19 In defining 
the conditions that trigger the applicability of mutual assistance guarantees, states 
are thus caught in a dilemma between the competing needs for maximum clarity 
and strategic ambivalence. 
 The purpose of the present section is to assess how these competing 
considerations have shaped the content of Article 5 NAT, Article 42(7) TEU, and 
Article 222 TFEU by reviewing and comparing the circumstances that trigger their 
application. 
A. Article 5 NAT 
Pursuant to Article 5 NAT, the contracting parties have agreed that an armed 
attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered 
an attack against them all and that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in 
exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 
51 of the UN Charter, will assist the party or parties so attacked.20 The duty of 
mutual assistance is thus engaged if an armed attack occurs against one or more of 
the parties within the geographical boundaries set by Article 5 NAT.21 
The term “armed attack” derives from Article 51 of the UN Charter. This is 
confirmed by the express reference made to that provision in Article 5 NAT and by 
the latter’s drafting history.22 In fact, the principal reason why the right of self-
defense was incorporated into the UN Charter in the first place was to acknowledge 
that mutual assistance arrangements concluded on a regional basis, such as the Act 
                                                 
17 See MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, DETERRENCE: THE DEFENCE CONTRIBUTION, 2019, JDN 1/19, 45–46 
(UK) (explaining the different forms of ambiguity and its benefits for deterrence). 
18 Id. at 45 (suggesting that leaving doubt about the exact threshold at which an adversary’s actions 
will trigger a response “allows the political leadership room to manoeuvre and allows for measured 
assessments of the impact of the adversary’s action without committing to retaliation.”). 
19 Id. at 46 (“If an adversary is clear what actions they can and cannot take, there is always the 
prospect of them circumventing a line or simply creating a large quantity of smaller actions, none 
of which might breach a clear red line.”). 
20 The first paragraph of NAT, supra note 1, art. 5 reads: “The Parties agree that an armed attack 
against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them 
all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the 
right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United 
Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert 
with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore 
and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.” 
21 NAT, supra note 1, art. 6 further defines what is meant by an armed attack against one or more 
of the parties “in Europe or North America” within the meaning of NAT art. 5. 
22 Minutes of the Eighteenth Meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security (Mar. 15, 
1949), in 3 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1948, WESTERN EUROPE, 213, 221 (1974) 
[hereinafter FRUS VOL. III]; see also The Vandenberg Resolution and the North Atlantic Treaty: 
Hearing on Executive L Before the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 81st Cong. 129, 155 (1949) 
[hereinafter Hearing on Executive L] (Informal Session, The North Atlantic Treaty) (“We have 
taken the words ‘armed attack’ from the United Nations Charter.”). 
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of Chapultepec of 1945,23 were compatible with the collective security machinery 
of the UN.24 Article 5 NAT thus merely gives effect to the inherent right of 
collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter and, contrary to what 
the Soviet Union claimed at the time,25 does not contradict the principles and aims 
of the UN.26 Indeed, the NAT is at pains to underline its compatibility with the UN 
system.27 Article 7 NAT explicitly declares that nothing in the agreement affects 
the rights and obligations of the contracting parties under the Charter.28 
The subordinate position of the NAT may suggest that the concept of 
“armed attack” has no autonomous meaning under Article 5 NAT, but carries the 
same connotations as in Article 51 of the UN Charter. It is certainly true that Article 
5 cannot authorize the use of force in self-defense in a broader set of circumstances 
than those envisaged in the Charter. Yet nothing in either agreement precludes the 
contracting parties of the NAT from adopting a more restrictive definition of armed 
attack for the purposes of Article 5. This is not, however, the approach they have 
taken in practice. 
When the NAT was signed in April 1949, little authoritative guidance on 
the concept of an armed attack existed. Government representatives and 
commentators were at something of a loss about the exact meaning of the phrase, 
including its relationship with the notion of “aggression.”29 Ultimately, a broad 
                                                 
23 DECLARATION ON RECIPROCAL ASSISTANCE AND AMERICAN SOLIDARITY BY THE GOVERNMENTS 
REPRESENTED AT THE INTER-AMERICAN CONFERENCE ON WAR AND PEACE, 12 U.S. DEP’T OF 
STATE, PUB. NO. 297, 339 (1945) (Act of Chapultepec). 
24 See Summary Report of the Fourth Meeting of Committee III/4, Doc. 576, III/4/9, in 12 
DOCUMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, 679, 680–
82 (1945); see also Minutes of the Thirty-Fifth Meeting of the United States Delegation (May 10, 
1945), in 1 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, DIPLOMATIC PAPERS 1945, GENERAL: THE 
UNITED NATIONS, 657, 659 (1967) [hereinafter FRUS VOL. I]; STANMIR A. ALEXANDROV, SELF-
DEFENCE AGAINST THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 81–92 (1996); Josef L. Kunz, 
Individual and Collective Self-Defense in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, 41 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 872 (1947). 
25 See Memorandum of the Government of the USSR Concerning the North Atlantic Treaty, in 
FRUS VOL. IV, supra note 15, at 261; see also Hans Kelsen, The North Atlantic Defense Treaty and 
the Charter of the United Nations, 19 NORDISK TIDSSKRIFT FOR INT’L RET. 41, 41–48 (1949); Hans 
Kelsen, Is the North Atlantic Treaty in Conformity with the Charter of the United Nations, 19 U. 
KAN. CITY L. REV. 1 (1950). But see Clyde Eagleton, The North Atlantic Defense Pact, 3 COLUM. 
J. INT’L AFF. 21, 26–28 (1949).  
26 Cf. Lawrence S. Kaplan, Collective Security and the Case of NATO 95, 97, in THE ORIGINS OF 
NATO (Joseph Smith ed., 1990) (arguing that a cursory reading of the NAT “could leave the 
impression that the pact was an ancillary instrument of the Charter.”). 
27 Compatibility with the “purposes, principles, and provisions of the Charter” was one of the 
conditions for U.S. participation in the NAT stipulated in the Vandenberg Resolution. S. Res. 239, 
80th Cong., 94 CONG. REC. 7791 (1948). 
28 This echoes U.N. Charter art. 103, which provides: “In the event of a conflict between the 
obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations 
under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.” 
29 Minutes of the Eighteenth Meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security (Mar. 15, 
1949), in FRUS VOL. III, supra note 22, at 213, 221–22. For academic commentary, see, for 
example, Grayson Kirk, The Atlantic Pact and International Security, 3 INT’L ORG. 239, 247–48 
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definition prevailed. Dean Acheson, the U.S. Secretary of State at the time, thought 
that an armed attack extended not only to the use of force by one state to overpower 
another, but also to the combination of external force with internal revolution.30 
Most importantly, the negotiating parties of the NAT decided not to adopt among 
the “agreed interpretations” of the NAT (a set of informal agreements on the 
meaning of certain phrases used in the draft)31 an understanding that an armed 
attack for the purposes of Article 5 means “one of sufficient gravity to constitute 
an attack by one State upon another.”32 Even though the NAT was first and 
foremost intended to deal with an “all-out attack” by the Soviet Union,33 the parties 
thus left open the possibility that even a lesser incident could qualify as an armed 
attack under Article 5,34 if they so determined.35 
The intervening years have clarified some aspects of the definition of an 
armed attack.36 In line with the judgment of the International Court of Justice in the 
Nicaragua case, today an armed attack is understood to refer to a use of force that 
reaches a certain level of gravity due to its scale and effect.37 Where exactly this 
threshold lies is the subject of continuing debate, but it is generally seen to be met 
when the use of force involves the loss of life or the physical destruction of 
objects.38 Notwithstanding the decision not to adopt a gravity threshold among the 
                                                 
(1949); A. L. Goodhart, The North Atlantic Treaty of 1949, 79 RECUEIL DES COURS 183, 223 (1951); 
Kunz, supra note 24, at 877–78; Emory Clark Smith, Legal Aspects of the North Atlantic Treaty, 20 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 497, 510 (1952). 
30 Hearing on Executive L, supra note 22, at 155 (Informal Session, The North Atlantic Treaty); see 
also id. at 372 (Senate Report No. 8 on Executive L). 
31 Minutes of the Eighteenth Meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, supra note 
29, at 213, 222–23. 
32 Sir O. Franks (Washington) to Mr. Bevin (Mar. 11, 1949), in THE BRUSSELS AND NORTH 
ATLANTIC TREATIES, 1947–1949, 428 (Tony Insall & Patrick Salmon eds., 2015) [hereinafter Insall 
& Salmon]. Contrary to this message, no agreement on a definition of armed attack could be reached 
and the idea to include one among the agreed interpretations was dropped. See Ambassador in 
United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mar. 29, 1949), in 15 DOCUMENTS ON 
CANADIAN EXTERNAL RELATIONS 603–04 (Hector Mackenzie ed., 1995) [hereinafter DCER VOL. 
XV]. For the final text of the agreed interpretations, see id. at 604–05; Minutes of the Eighteenth 
Meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, supra note 29, at 213, 222–23; see also 
ESCOTT REID, TIME OF FEAR AND HOPE: THE MAKING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY 1947-
1949, at 261 (1977). 
33 Ambassador in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs (Feb. 25, 1949), in DCER 
VOL. XV, supra note 32, at 546, 548. 
34 See also THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY AND THE UNITED NATIONS BY AMBASSADOR PHILIP C. 
JESSUP, 20 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, PUB. NO. 3464, 486–87 (1949); cf. Kunz, supra note 24, at 878 
(arguing that the notion of “armed attack” covers any illegal attack, including small border 
incidents). 
35 Hearing on Executive L, supra note 22, at 85, 110 (The North Atlantic Treaty, Executive Session); 
see also REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE PRESIDENT ON THE NORTH ATLANTIC 
TREATY, 20 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, PUB. NO. 512, 532, 534–35 (1949). 
36 For a comprehensive discussion, see generally TOM RUYS, ‘ARMED ATTACK’ AND ARTICLE 51 OF 
THE UN CHARTER: EVOLUTIONS IN CUSTOMARY LAW AND PRACTICE (2010). 
37 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 
I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 195 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua]. 
38 See, e.g., TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER 
OPERATIONS Rule 71, 341 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2d ed. 2017). 
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agreed interpretations of Article 5 NAT, such a threshold does apply as a matter of 
customary international law and Article 51 of the UN Charter. As a result of more 
recent state practice, it is now also widely, though not universally,39 accepted that 
an armed attack may emanate from a non-state actor and give rise to the right to use 
force in self-defense even where the latter does not act under the control of a state.40 
State practice under the NAT has made a significant contribution to this 
development.41 Throughout the seven decades of its existence, Article 5 has only 
been invoked once, in response to the terrorist attacks perpetrated against the United 
States on September 11, 2001.42 By determining that the attack on September 11 
was covered by Article 5, the Allies recognized that the right of self-defense can be 
triggered by an armed attack launched by a non-state actor.43 They also confirmed 
that any armed attack must have a transnational character, meaning that it cannot 
arise wholly within one nation.44 
Whether or not an armed attack has occurred is a question of fact and law. 
Article 5 does not specify how this question should be answered. The negotiating 
history, however, makes abundantly clear that determining the existence of an 
armed attack is the sole prerogative of each individual signatory.45 This principle 
was emphasized from the very outset of the talks,46 affirmed by all representatives 
                                                 
39 See, e.g., Olivier Corten & François Dubuisson, Operation Liberté Immuable: Une Extension 
Abusive du Concept de Légitime Défense, 106 REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT INT’L PUB. 51 (2002).  
40 Kimberley Trapp, Can Non-State Actors Mount an Armed Attack?, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK 
OF THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 679 (Marc Weller ed., 2015). 
41 Carsten Stahn, International Law at Crossroads? The Impact of September 11, 62 ZEITSCHRIFT 
FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VÖLKERRECHT 183, 189 (2002). 
42 Statement by the North Atlantic Council (Sept. 12, 2001), 
https://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-124e.htm [https://perma.cc/XL8V-22LK]; confirmed by 
NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, Statement (Oct. 2, 2001), 
[https://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s011002a.htm [https://perma.cc/J6SQ-YWXB]. 
43 For critical reactions, see, e.g., Antonio Cassese, Terrorism is Also Disrupting Some Crucial Legal 
Categories of International Law, 12 EUR. J. INT’L. L. 993, 995–98 (2001); Broderick C. Grady, 
Article of the North Atlantic Treaty: Past, Present, and Uncertain Future, 31 GA. J. INT’L. & COMP. 
L. 167, 184–93 (2002); Eric P.J. Myjer & Nigel D. White, The Twin Towers Attack: An Unlimited 
Right to Self-Defence, 7(1) J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 5, 7–8 (2002). But see Hearing on Executive L, 
supra note 22, at 372 (Senate Report No. 8 on Executive L) (noting that “article 5 would come into 
operation only when a nation had committed an international crime by launching an armed attack 
against a party to the treaty”) (emphasis added). 
44 Statement by the North Atlantic Council, supra note 42 (“The Council agreed that if it is 
determined that this attack was directed from abroad against the United States, it shall be regarded 
as an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.”). 
45 This is widely recognized in the literature. See, e.g., HANFORD L. HOSKINS, THE ATLANTIC PACT 
32 (1949); Georg Schwarzenberger, The North Atlantic Pact, 2 WESTERN POL. Q. 309, 312 (1949); 
BVerfG [Federal Constitutional Court] Dec. 18, 1984, 68 ATOMWAFFENSTATIONIERUNG 
[BVERFGE] 1 ¶ 159 (Ger.) [hereinafter Atomwaffenstationierung]. 
46 See, e.g., Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of the United States-United Kingdom-Canada Security 
Conversations (Mar. 29, 1948), in FRUS VOL. III, supra note 22, at 69; Minute from Mr. Bevin to 
Mr. Attlee (Apr. 6, 1948), in Insall & Salmon, supra note 32, at 147; Minutes of the Fifth Meeting 
of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security (July 9, 1948), in FRUS VOL. III, supra note 22, 
at 169, 176–77. 
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in the Washington Paper that served as the basis for the drafting process,47 and 
repeatedly recalled throughout the negotiations.48 Accordingly, a situation may 
arise where different Allies arrive at opposite conclusions about the existence of an 
armed attack.49 One group may consider that an attack has occurred, triggering their 
responsibilities under Article 5, while another group may reject that view. Policy 
considerations obviously militate in favor of developing a common position, as 
happened in response to the September 11 attacks.50 The text of the NAT lends 
some support to this policy imperative. Although the assistance to be provided 
under Article 5 may be carried out individually or in concert with other parties, the 
obligation to assist applies to the parties collectively, in accordance with the 
principle that an attack against one is an attack against all. Article 5 therefore does 
not seem to envisage a situation where one group of nations adopts whatever 
measures of assistance it considers necessary, including the use of armed force, 
whereas the rest of the Alliance remains idle or even opposes such action. The fact 
that the parties resolved to “unite their efforts for collective defence” implies a 
desire for a united reaction.51 This suggests that the North Atlantic Council, 
NATO’s highest decision-making organ,52 ought to consider the situation so as to 
develop a consensus position.53 Nevertheless, in the absence of a consensus, 
nothing in the language of the NAT precludes a party from determining that it has 
suffered an armed attack and from requesting the assistance of the other parties, nor 
one or more Allies from providing such assistance on a bilateral or multilateral 
basis.54 
                                                 
47 Memorandum by the Participants in the Washington Security Talks, July 6 to September 9, 
Submitted to Their Respective Governments for Study and Comment (Sept. 9, 1948), in FRUS VOL. 
III, supra note 22, at 237, 245. 
48 See, e.g., Memorandum from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister (Jan. 4, 
1949), in DCER VOL. XV, supra note 32, at 478, 479–80; Hearing on Executive L, supra note 22, 
at 88 (The North Atlantic Treaty, Executive Session) (“It has been made clear to [the negotiating 
parties] that each party must have to determine for itself the question of fact as to whether or not 
there had been an armed attack.”). 
49 See Stephen Hill, The Role of NATO’s Legal Adviser, in THE ROLE OF LEGAL ADVISERS IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 213, 227–28 (Andraž Zidar & Jean-Pierre Gauci eds., 2016). 
50 Edgar Buckley, Invoking Article 5, NATO REV. (Summer 2016), 
https://www.nato.int/DOCU/review/2006/Invokation-Article-5/Invoking_Article_5/EN/index.htm 
[https://perma.cc/NH24-XWF4]. 
51 NAT, supra note 1, preamble; see also THE NORTH ATLANTIC PACT: COLLECTIVE DEFENSE AND 
THE PRESERVATION OF PEACE, SECURITY, AND FREEDOM IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC COMMUNITY, 20 
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE PUB. NO. 3462, 342–43 (1949) (referring to the “clear intention of the Parties 
to the Pact to take united action”). 
52 NAT, supra note 1, art. 9. 
53 NAT, supra note 1, preamble. Hearing on Executive L, supra note 22, at 372 (Senate Report No. 
8 on Executive L). 
54 See Hearing on Executive L, supra note 22, at 372 (Senate Report No. 8 on Executive L) 
(suggesting that if it was not clear whether an armed attack had occurred, “there would presumably 
be consultation but each party would have the responsibility of determining for itself the answer to 
this question of fact.”); see also infra note 268 and the accompanying text; cf. REPORT OF THE 
SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE PRESIDENT ON THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY, supra note 35, at 534 
(suggesting that in clear cases “action would not necessarily depend on consultation”). But see 
ALEXANDER ORAKHELASHVILI, COLLECTIVE SECURITY 284 (2011) (suggesting that “under Article 
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B. Article 42(7) TEU 
In 1992, the member states of the European Economic Community signed 
the Treaty on European Union at Maastricht.55 One of the TEU’s objectives was to 
strengthen cooperation in security matters by launching a Common Foreign and 
Security Policy.56 The new policy included plans for the progressive development 
of a “common defence policy,” which was understood might over time lead to a 
“common defence.”57 In line with these commitments, the member states of the EU 
took a series of steps over the next decade to deepen their cooperation in the field 
of security and defense.58 The adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007 marked a 
new stage in this process.59 The Lisbon Treaty upgraded the existing provisions on 
defense cooperation and introduced, for the first time, a mutual defense 
commitment among the member states of the EU. Article 42(7) TEU provides that 
if a member state is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other 
member states shall have an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in 
their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter.60 The duty of mutual 
aid and assistance is thus triggered if a member state becomes the victim of “armed 
aggression” on its territory.  
The TEU does not define “armed aggression.” While the term “aggression” 
appears in several places in the UN Charter,61 its relationship to the notion of 
“armed attack” is not settled.62 A few points are nevertheless beyond doubt. An act 
of aggression within the meaning of the Charter entails the unlawful use of armed 
                                                 
5 decision making is premised on a consensus within the North Atlantic Council”). 
55 Treaty on European Union preamble, Feb. 7 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1 [hereinafter Maastricht 
TEU]. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 The Lisbon Treaty was designed to revise the founding treaties of the EU after the more ambitious 
plans for reform set out in the draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe were rejected by 
European voters. The Lisbon Treaty amended the TEU and renamed the Treaty establishing the 
European Community into the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. See JEAN-CLAUDE 
PIRIS, THE LISBON TREATY: A LEGAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 275 (2010).  
60 TEU, supra note 1, art. 42(7) reads as follows: “If a Member State is the victim of armed 
aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and 
assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations 
Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain 
Member States. 
Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the 
foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation.” 
61 U.N. Charter arts 1(1), 39 and 53(1). 
62 INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, SYDNEY CONFERENCE (2018), USE OF FORCE 26 (2018); see 
Dino Kritsiotis, Topographies of Force, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT: 
EXPLORING THE FAULTLINES 29, 45–63 (Michael Schmitt & Jelena Pejic eds., 2007); Jan Klabbers, 
Intervention, Armed Intervention, Armed Attack, Threat to Peace, Act of Aggression, and Threat or 
Use of Force: What’s the Difference?, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE USE OF FORCE IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 489 (Marc Weller ed., 2015). 
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force.63 The fact that Article 42(7) TEU refers to armed aggression, rather than to 
an act of aggression pure and simple, confirms that it uses the word in this sense. 
While every act of armed aggression therefore entails the use of force, not every 
such act necessarily rises to the level of an armed attack that triggers the application 
of the right of self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter.64 However, as the 
International Court of Justice has confirmed,65 certain acts of aggression may cross 
that threshold and entitle the victim to use force in self-defense. 
Against this background, two alternative readings of Article 42(7) TEU are 
possible. A wide interpretation recognizes that the concept of aggression is broader 
in scope than the notion of armed attack.66 That was the position taken by the 
majority of the delegations drafting the NAT.67 On this view, the duty of mutual 
aid and assistance could be engaged even where an EU member state is the victim 
of an unlawful use of force that does not reach the gravity threshold of an armed 
attack.68 The fact that Article 42(7) requires any aid and assistance to be rendered 
in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter does not preclude this 
interpretation. Clearly, if an act of aggression falls below the level of an armed 
attack, the other member states may not assist the victim by using armed force in 
the exercise of the right of self-defense.69 Rather, in such cases they would have to 
provide other forms of aid and assistance to the victim that are permissible under 
the UN Charter, in line with their commitment to use “all means” within their 
power. 
By contrast, a narrow interpretation equates “armed aggression” with 
                                                 
63. General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX), art. 1, Definition of Aggression, (Dec. 14, 1974) 
[hereinafter Definition of Aggression]; Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2), 
July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90. But see Julius Stone, Hopes and Loopholes in the 1974 Definition 
of Aggression 71 AM. J. INT’L L. 224, 230–31 (1977) (suggesting that the disagreement as to whether 
extreme economic coercion could constitute aggression remains unresolved). 
64 The non-consensual presence of foreign armed forces, for example, which Article 3(e) of the 
Definition of Aggression lists among the acts that qualify as an act of aggression, does not 
necessarily cross the gravity threshold of an armed attack. Id. art. 3(e); cf. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, 
supra note 38, at 265 (noting that the majority of experts did not consider the mere presence of 
foreign military aircraft without the consent of the territorial state to constitute an armed attack). But 
see YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 202 (5th ed. 2011). 
65 Nicaragua, supra note 37, ¶ 195. 
66 MARTIN REICHARD, THE EU-NATO RELATIONSHIP: A LEGAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE 209 
(2006). 
67 Minutes of the Eighteenth Meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, supra note 
29, at 213, 221–22. 
68 Cf. Mattias G. Fischer & Daniel Thym, Article 42 [CSDP: Goals and Objectives; Mutual 
Defence], in THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION (TEU), A COMMENTARY 1201, 1224–25 (Hermann-
Josef Blanke & Stelio Mangiameli eds., 2013) [hereinafter TEU, A COMMENTARY] (arguing that, 
while an analysis of the English language version suggests “that the EU Treaty’s reference to armed 
aggression instead of armed attack deliberately lowers the threshold for mutual assistance,” an 
analysis of the French language version and consideration of the explicit reference to Article 51 
“supports an interpretation of Art. 42.7 EU in line with international law”). 
69 In other words, Article 51 of the Charter is only engaged if the member states were to use force. 
See Laurie O’Connor, Legality of the Use of Force in Syria against Islamic State and the Khorasan 
Group, 3 J. USE OF FORCE & INT’L L. 70, 91 (2016). 
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“armed attack.” The duty of mutual aid and assistance would thus be triggered only 
if a member state becomes the victim of an armed attack on its territory within the 
meaning of Article 51 of the UN Charter.70 This approach is supported by the fact 
that the phrase “armed aggression” echoes the French language version of Article 
51, which employs the words “agression armée” in place of “armed attack.” This 
reading is further supported by the drafting history of Article 42(7) TEU. The 
predecessor of Article 42(7) first appeared in the Treaty Establishing a Constitution 
for Europe adopted by the European Convention in 2003.71 In preparing this clause, 
the drafters’ express intention was to replicate the mutual assistance obligations 
laid down in the Brussels Treaty for Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration 
and Collective Self-Defence of 1948,72 as modified in 1954.73 Whereas the English 
language version of Article 5 of the Modified Brussels Treaty refers to “armed 
attack,” the French version uses the phrase “agression armée.” The first draft of 
what later became Article 42(7) was prepared in French and thus employed the 
words “agression armée.” The English version of this draft thus seems to be the 
product of a literal translation of the French text rather than a deliberate attempt to 
depart from the authentic English wording of the Modified Brussels Treaty. 
Nevertheless, the published preparatory works do not allow firm 
conclusions to be drawn about the intent of the negotiating states.74 The phrase 
“armed aggression” was retained in all subsequent drafts of what is now Article 
42(7) TEU. However, at one point, it was proposed that the same phrase used in a 
companion clause dealing with the implementation of the duty of mutual assistance 
should be replaced with the words “armed attack.”75 Eventually, this second clause 
                                                 
70 Cf. Teija Tiilikainen, The Mutual Assistance Obligation in the European Union’s Treaty of 
Lisbon, Publications of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, 15 (2008) (noting that the 
interpretative practices governing UN Charter art. 51 play a key role in the interpretation of TEU 
art. 42(7) and limit the activities that may be carried out within the framework of the latter 
provision). 
71 On the negotiating history, see REICHARD, supra note 66, at 191–208; Jolyon Howorth, The 
European Draft Constitutional Treaty and the Future of the European Defence Initiative: A 
Question of Flexibility, 9 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 483, 492–95 (2004). 
72 Treaty for Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence, Mar. 17, 
1948, 19 U.N.T.S. 51 [hereinafter Brussels Treaty]; see Final Report of Working Group VIII – 
Defence, EUR. CONV. 461/02, 21 (Dec. 16, 2002); see also Contribution by Mr. Dominique de 
Villepin and Mr. Joschka Fischer, members of the Convention, presenting joint Franco-German 
proposals for the European Convention in the field of European security and defence policy, EUR. 
CONV. 422/02, 2–4 (Nov. 22, 2002). 
73 Protocol Modifying and Completing the Brussels Treaty, Oct. 23, 1954, 211 U.N.T.S. 342 
[hereinafter Paris Protocol]. The Paris Protocol revised the original Brussels Treaty to pave the way 
for the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy, two former enemy nations, to the 
Treaty. As a result, Article IV of the original Brussels Treaty, which set out its collective assistance 
clause, was renumbered to become Article V of the Modified Brussels Treaty. Otherwise the text of 
the clause remained unchanged. 
74 As opposed to the intentions of the original drafters of the Constitutional Treaty.  
75 IGC 2003 – Editorial and Legal Comments on the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for 
Europe, CIG 4/1/03 REV 1, 376, art. III-214 (Oct. 6, 2003); Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution 
for Europe, CIG 50/03, 184, art. III-214 (Nov. 25, 2003).  
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became superfluous and was deleted.76 This episode demonstrates that the 
negotiating parties were aware of the discrepancy between the English version of 
their draft on the one hand and the original language of Article 5 of the Modified 
Brussels Treaty and Article 51 of the UN Charter on the other. However, no steps 
were taken to eliminate this inconsistency. Although this does not prove 
conclusively that the member states intended to enter into broader commitments 
than those laid down in Article 5 of the Modified Brussels Treaty, this possibility 
cannot be discounted completely.77 Accordingly, both the wide and narrow 
interpretation of Article 42(7) are tenable. 
Article 42(7) TEU does not determine who is entitled to decide whether a 
member state has become the victim of armed aggression on its territory. Nor does 
the negotiating history provide any clues. However, it is useful to recall in this 
context the position under the Brussels Treaty. At least some states have taken the 
view that it was for each contracting party to determine whether an armed attack 
triggering its obligation to provide aid and assistance under the Brussels Treaty has 
occurred, even if this unilateral right was not stated in express terms.78 The rationale 
for this view was outlined by Sir Eric Beckett, Legal Adviser to the UK Foreign 
Office at the time. It is the usual position under treaties of alliance, wrote Sir Eric 
Beckett, that each party remains the judge of whether its duty of mutual assistance 
has been engaged, unless the treaty provides otherwise.79 Regardless of whether 
auto-interpretation really is an inherent feature of treaties of alliance or not,80 it is 
worth recalling that Article 42(7) is not subject to the jurisdiction of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union or any other compulsory interpretative process under 
the TEU.81 Its interpretation therefore falls to each individual member state. Should 
the member states arrive at different positions, this would engage their duty to 
consult one another within the European Council and the Council of the European 
Union “in order to determine a common approach.”82 However, this obligation of 
consensus-building does not alter the fact that it is for each member state to 
determine the existence of armed aggression. Even on the assumption that the 
European Council and the Council of the European Union are empowered to adopt 
                                                 
76 IGC 2003 – Defence, CIG 57/1/03 REV 1, 4 (Dec. 5, 2003). 
77 Cf. Niklas I. M. Nováky, The Invocation of the European Union’s Mutual Assistance Clause: A 
Call for Enforced Solidarity, 22 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 357, 370 (2017) (suggesting that at least 
some EU member states adhere to a broader interpretation of TEU art. 42(2)). 
78 Minute from Mr. Bevin to Mr. Attlee (Apr. 6, 1948), in Insall & Salmon, supra note 32, at 147; 
Letter from Sir O. Franks (Washington) to Mr. Bevin (Feb. 17, 1949), in Insall & Salmon, supra 
note 32, at 385, 387. 
79 SIR W. ERIC BECKETT, THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY, THE BRUSSELS TREATY AND THE 
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 28 (1950).  
80 Cf. Secretary of State for External Affairs to Ambassador in United States (Mar. 4, 1949), in 
DCER VOL. XV, supra note 32, at 564 (noting the concerns of the Legal Advisor of the Canadian 
Department of External Affairs that leaving it up to each signatory to take such action “as it deems 
necessary” under NAT art. 5 “does a good deal more than make explicit what had been implicit” in 
the agreement). 
81 TEU, supra note 1, art. 24(1).  
82 Id. art. 32.  
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formal decisions with regard to Article 42(7) at all, which is questionable,83 any 
decisions having military or defense implications are to be taken unanimously.84 
This preserves each member state’s final say on whether or not an act of armed 
aggression has taken place. 
C. Article 222 TFEU 
In addition to the classic collective defense guarantee set out in Article 42(7) 
TEU, the Treaty of Lisbon also introduced a more wide-ranging solidarity clause. 
Article 222 TFEU requires the Union and the member states to “act jointly in a 
spirit of solidarity if a member state is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim 
of a natural or man-made disaster.”85 In addition to the duty to act jointly, Article 
222 also imposes individual obligations on the EU and on the member states to 
respond to such attacks or disasters.  
The adoption of this clause was motivated by a widespread feeling among 
members of the Convention on the Future of Europe, the body tasked with drafting 
a new constitutional treaty for the EU between 2001 and 2003, that the security 
environment in Europe had changed considerably.86 While the threat of territorial 
invasion had subsided, the risk posed by terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, 
and asymmetric forms of warfare had increased, as demonstrated by the September 
11 attacks.87 These developments seemed to underline the need for more flexible 
                                                 
83 Pursuant to TEU Article 25(b) the European Council and the Council may adopt formal decisions 
to provide for operational action or a common position by the Union. However, mutual assistance 
under TEU Article 42(7) does not involve action by the Union, see infra Section 0, but is at best an 
example of systematic cooperation between the member states within the meaning of TEU Article 
25(c). 
84 TEU, supra note 1, art. 31(4). 
85 The first two paragraphs of TFEU, supra note 1, art. 222 read as follows: 
1. The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the 
object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster. The Union shall mobilise 
all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the Member 
States, to: 
(a) prevent the terrorist threat in the territory of the Member States; protect democratic institutions 
and the civilian population from any terrorist attack; assist a Member State in its territory, at the 
request of its political authorities, in the event of a terrorist attack; 
(b) assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political authorities, in the event of a 
natural or man-made disaster. 
2. Should a Member State be the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made 
disaster, the other Member States shall assist it at the request of its political authorities. To that end, 
the Member States shall coordinate between themselves in the Council. 
86 The Convention was tasked with preparing a draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe 
designed to replace the existing founding treaties of the EU. Following further refinement, the 
Constitutional Treaty was formally adopted by the member states on October 29, 2004. As part of 
their domestic ratification processes, France and the Netherlands held national referenda on the 
Treaty, ending in its rejection by French and Dutch voters. In response, the member states adopted 
the less ambitious Treaty of Lisbon on December 13, 2007. On the origins of the Lisbon Treaty, see 
PIRIS, supra note 59. 
87 Summary of the meeting held on 29 Oct. 2002, EUR. CONV. 399/02 (Oct. 29, 2002); see also 
Introductory Note by the Secretariat on the scope of ESDP, EUR. CONV. WORKING GROUP VIII, 
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and adaptable capabilities, in particular the need to use civil, police, and military 
resources in an integrated manner. The solidarity clause was meant to respond to 
this new reality by directing the Union and its member states to mobilize all 
instruments at their disposal. In doing so, the clause was intended to take advantage 
of the full spectrum of the EU’s comprehensive capabilities and thereby clearly 
distinguish it from a classic military alliance such as NATO.88 
As originally proposed, the solidarity clause applied only to terrorist attacks 
emanating from non-state actors.89 During the drafting process, members of the 
European Convention argued that the clause should also extend to cover threats and 
dangers posed by disasters of a natural or human origin.90 These suggestions were 
incorporated into the draft Constitutional Treaty and retained by the member states 
in the Treaty of Lisbon.91 Accordingly, under Article 222 TFEU, the Union and the 
member states’ shared and individual solidarity obligations are triggered if a 
member state becomes the object of a “terrorist attack” or the victim of a “natural 
or man-made disaster.”  
The publicly available records do not reveal whether the meanings of a 
“terrorist attack” and a “natural or man-made disaster” were discussed at all during 
the drafting process. However, the Council of the European Union subsequently 
has defined these terms in Decision 2014/415/EU,92 which makes arrangements for 
the implementation of the Union’s own obligations under Article 222 TFEU. 
Although the Decision is not concerned with the obligations of the member states,93 
there is no reason why its definitions should not be followed in the interpretation 
of the duties borne by the member states, too. 
Decision 2014/415/EU defines a “disaster” to mean “any situation which 
has or may have a severe impact on people, the environment or property, including 
cultural heritage.”94 This is a broad and flexible definition, but the requirement that 
the impact must be “severe” echoes the views expressed by national delegations 
that the solidarity clause should be reserved for “specific exceptional and 
emergency circumstances.”95 This gravity threshold is also reflected in the 
procedure governing the invocation of the clause. Decision 2014/415/EU provides 
that a member state must first exploit the possibilities offered by existing means 
                                                 
Working Doc. 10 (Oct. 25, 2002). 
88 Final Report of Working Group VIII – Defence, supra note 72. 
89 Draft Articles on External Action in the Constitutional Treaty, EUR. CONV. 685/03 (Apr. 23, 
2003). 
90 Summary Sheet of Proposals for Amendments Concerning External Action, Including Defence 
Policy, EUR. CONV. 707/03 (May 9, 2003); Summary Report of the Plenary Session, EUR. CONV. 
748/03 (May 27, 2003); Reactions to the Draft Articles of the Revised Text of Part One, EUR. CONV. 
779/03 (June 4, 2003). 
91 Revised Text of Part One, EUR. CONV. 797/03 (June 10, 2003). 
92 Council Decision 2014/415/EU of 24 June 2014 on the Arrangements for the Implementation by 
the Union of the Solidarity Clause, ¶ 4, 2014 O.J. (L 192) 53. 
93 Id. preamble ¶ 1.  
94 Id. art. 3(a). 
95 Outcome of Proceedings of CATS on 6 and 7 October 2011, ¶ 3, 15498/11 (Nov. 3, 2011). 
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and tools at national and Union level, before coming to the conclusion that the crisis 
clearly overwhelms the response capabilities available to it.96 Accordingly, the 
disaster must be of such severity as to plainly overwhelm the capabilities that would 
otherwise be available to the affected country.  
Council Decision 2014/415/EU defines a “terrorist attack” to mean a 
terrorist offense as defined in Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA,97 now 
replaced by Directive 2017/541 on combating terrorism.98 The latter sets out a 
detailed list of terrorist offenses. Collectively, it defines them as intentional acts 
which, given their nature or context, may seriously damage a country or an 
international organization, if committed with a specific terrorist aim, namely to 
seriously intimidate a population, to unduly compel a government or an 
international organization to perform or abstain from performing any act, or to 
seriously destabilize or destroy the fundamental political, constitutional, economic, 
or social structures of a country or an international organization.99 The list of 
specific terrorist offenses is extensive and includes acts such as attacks upon a 
person’s life which may cause death, causing extensive destruction of public 
facilities or private property likely to endanger human life or result in major 
economic loss, and the release of dangerous substances, or causing fires, floods, or 
explosions, the effect of which is to endanger human life.100 
D. Comparison 
Analysis reveals a substantial overlap in the circumstances that trigger the 
application of the Transatlantic and European mutual assistance clauses, as 
depicted in Figure 1. As discussed earlier, Article 42(7) TEU is open to a narrow 
and a wider interpretation.101 The narrow reading equates “armed aggression” with 
“armed attack.” On this interpretation, the duty of mutual aid and assistance under 
Article 42(7) is triggered in exactly the same circumstances as under Article 5 NAT: 
both require that a party should fall victim to an armed attack. The material scope 
of the two provisions therefore is identical and coincides with the conditions that 
give rise to the right of individual and collective self-defense under Article 51 of 
the UN Charter. Less grave uses of force and other incidents that do not reach the 
threshold of an armed attack fall outside their scope. The wider reading of Article 
42(7) construes the notion of “armed aggression” to cover acts of armed force that 
do not constitute armed attacks. On this interpretation, the member states of the EU 
are bound to assist each other even in circumstances where Article 5 is not 
applicable. However, the size of any potential gap between Article 5 and Article 
42(7) should not be overestimated. Although the International Court of Justice has 
                                                 
96 Council Decision 2014/415/EU, supra note 92, art. 4. 
97 Id. art. 3(b). 
98 Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2017 on 
Combating Terrorism and Replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and Amending 
Council Decision 2005/671/JHA, 2017 O.J. (L 88) 6. 
99 Id. art. 3. 
100 Id. art. 3(1). 
101 See supra Section 0. 
423 
2019 / Mutual Assistance Clauses of the North Atlantic and EU Treaties 
stopped short of equating armed aggression with armed attack, its jurisprudence 
seems to imply that there is not much of a gap at all.102 Moreover, at least some of 
the acts that may fall within this gap, for instance a maritime blockade,103 are either 
of limited relevance in practice or unlikely to take place in the territory of a member 
state, as required by Article 42(7). Consequently, Article 5 and Article 42(7) are 
engaged in identical, or near identical, circumstances.  
 
 
Figure 1 
In at least one respect, the scope of application of Article 222 TFEU is 
broader than that of either Article 5 NAT or Article 42(7) TEU.104 This is so because 
Article 222 extends to situations that entail no or only relatively low levels of 
deliberate violence. These include natural disasters as well as certain terrorist 
offenses, such as kidnapping or hostage-taking.105 It should be noted that not only 
the commission of terrorist offenses, but also the threat of committing such offenses 
qualifies as a terrorist attack within the meaning of Article 222.106 Similarly, the 
definition of a disaster under Decision 2014/415/EU includes situations which may 
have a severe impact. Consequently, Article 222 applies to acts and events which 
                                                 
102 Cf. Nicaragua, supra note 37, ¶ 257 (assessing the question of “aggression in the form of armed 
subversion” from the perspective of the right of individual and collective self-defense); see, e.g., 
Definition of Aggression, supra note 63, art. 3(f) (classifying the “action of a State in allowing its 
territory, which it has placed at the disposal of another State, to be used by that other State for 
perpetrating an act of aggression against a third State” as an act of aggression). However, it is 
difficult to qualify such action as an armed attack in its own right or indeed as an act of armed 
aggression. 
103 Definition of Aggression, supra note 63, art. 3(c). 
104 Luigi Lonardo, Integration in European Defence: Some Legal Considerations, 2 EUR. PAPERS 
887, 895 (2017). 
105 Directive (EU) 2017/541, supra note 98, art. 3(1)(c). 
106 Id. art. 3(1)(j). 
ter
ro
rist a
tta
ck
 / 
m
a
n
-m
a
d
e d
isa
ster
  
Art 42(7) 
TEU 
Art 5 NAT 
Art 222 
TFEU 
armed attack 
armed aggression? 
use of force 
natural disaster 
 
 
424 
Harvard National Security Journal / Vol. 10 
do not involve the use of force at all or which remain below the level of an armed 
attack or armed aggression. Nevertheless, it is clear that at least some terrorist 
offenses could qualify as armed attacks. These include lethal attacks and the 
extensive destruction of property,107 provided that in each case the requisite scale 
and intensity is met. The terrorist attack that took place in Paris on November 13, 
2015, which left 130 people dead and more than 400 injured, offers an example.108 
Accordingly, Article 222 extends to situations that could trigger the applicability of 
Article 5 and Article 42(7) as well as to situations that do not. 
However, in other respects the scope of Article 222 TFEU is narrower than 
that of Article 5 NAT and Article 42(7) TEU. The solidarity clause is engaged only 
in the case of a terrorist attack or a natural or man-made disaster. While a large-
scale invasion launched by a third state against a NATO or EU nation would 
undoubtedly bring Article 5 and Article 42(7) into play, it would not constitute a 
terrorist attack within the meaning of Article 222. Could such an attack nonetheless 
qualify as a man-made disaster? As we saw, the definition of a “disaster” adopted 
in Decision 2014/415/EU covers “any situation” that may have a severe impact on 
people, the environment or property, including cultural heritage. A disaster is 
therefore defined by its impact or effect. In principle, there is no reason why a 
conventional or unconventional armed attack could not qualify as a disaster for the 
purposes of Article 222, provided that its impact is sufficiently severe to clearly 
overwhelm the response capability of the country affected. This gravity threshold 
means that not every situation that triggers the applicability of Article 5 and Article 
42(7) will automatically engage Article 222 too. In fact, the threshold is likely to 
serve as a powerful disincentive for invoking Article 222. Except in the gravest of 
situations, few governments are likely to admit that an adversary has overcome 
their country’s defensive capabilities, especially if that adversary is a non-state 
actor.109 
The geographical scope of application of the three clauses also differs. As 
long as it falls within the geographical boundaries defined by Article 6 NAT, the 
duty of mutual assistance under Article 5 NAT may be triggered by an attack on a 
party’s armed forces located outside their national territory, for instance by an 
attack on naval assets on the high seas or on military units stationed in the territory 
                                                 
107 Id. arts. 3(1)(a) and (d). 
108 U.N. SCOR, 70th Sess. 7565th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc S/PV.7565 (Nov. 20, 2015). But see 
O’Connor, supra note 69, at 80. 
109 Cf. Stan Anton & Cristina Bogzeanu, A Comparative Analysis of Mutual Defence and Collective 
Defence Clauses, 57 STRATEGIC IMPACT 7, 12 (2015) (suggesting that by opting for TEU art. 42(7) 
rather than TFEU art. 222 in its response to the Paris attack of Nov. 13, 2015, the French 
Government signaled that the attack did not overwhelm its capacity to respond); Nováky, supra note 
77, at 367 (“[I]nvoking the solidarity clause would have sent a message to the French public that 
France could no longer handle its internal security.”). But see Peter Hilpold, Article 222, 
forthcoming in THE TREATY ON THE FUNCTIONING OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (TFEU), A 
COMMENTARY § 6 (Hermann-Josef Blanke & Stelio Mangiameli eds.) (on file with the author) 
[hereinafter TFEU, A COMMENTARY] (suggesting that the practical relevance of TFEU art. 222 
ranks far above that of TEU art. 42(7)). 
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of another party.110 By contrast, the duty of mutual assistance under Article 42(7) 
TEU applies only when an EU member state falls victim to an act of armed 
aggression on its own territory, but not when the aggression is directed against 
national assets located outside its borders. The same limitation also applies to the 
Union’s duties under Article 222(1) TFEU.111 However, Decision 2014/415/EU 
takes an expansive approach and defines a member state’s territory for these 
purposes to include not only its land area, internal waters, territorial sea, and 
airspace, but also infrastructure, such as off-shore oil and gas installations, located 
in its territorial sea, exclusive economic zone, or continental shelf.112 No territorial 
limitation applies to Article 222(2) TFEU, meaning that an EU member state may 
request assistance from the other member states on a bilateral level even where it 
has become the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made 
disaster outside its own national territory.113 It is difficult to envisage a strictly 
extra-territorial attack or disaster overwhelming a country’s ability to respond, 
however. 
Since Article 5 NAT and Article 42(7) TEU overlap in their material scope 
of application, a party that has suffered an armed attack on its territory and is a 
member of both NATO and the EU may seek assistance under either provision—
or under both at the same time. Such a party may also fall back on Article 5 if the 
assistance received under Article 42(7) is insufficient and vice versa.114 In addition, 
EU member states also benefit from the arrangements laid down in Article 222 
TFEU. The added value of Article 222 lies in the fact that it extends to terrorist 
attacks and man-made disasters below the level of an armed attack. Accordingly, 
in situations where the other parties are reluctant to accept that a terrorist attack or 
man-made disaster qualifies as an armed attack under Article 5 or as an act of armed 
aggression under Article 42(7), the affected member state may request assistance 
under Article 222(2), provided that the gravity threshold is met. By contrast, in 
circumstances where all three provisions are applicable, it is unlikely that an EU 
member state would derive any benefit from invoking Article 222 in preference 
over Article 5 or Article 42(7). In fact, doing so would entail a very public 
admission that its responsive capabilities have been overwhelmed. It would also 
entail the judicial oversight by the Court of Justice of the European Union, which 
has jurisdiction over Article 222, but not over Article 42(7).115 
                                                 
110 NAT, supra note 1, art. 6(2). 
111 This is somewhat ironic, given that Article 222 is to be found among the provisions TFEU dealing 
with external relations. 
112 Council Decision 2014/415/EU, supra note 92, art. 2. 
113 Contra Marie Fuchs-Drapier, The European Union’s Solidarity Clause in the Event of a Terrorist 
Attack: Towards Solidarity or Maintaining Sovereignty?, 19 J. CONTINGENCIES & CRISIS MGMT. 
184, 186 (2011); see also Peter Hilpold, Filing a Buzzword with Life: The Implementation of the 
Solidarity Clause in Article 222 TFEU, 42.3 LEGAL ISSUES OF ECON. INTEGRATION 209, 219–20 
(2015).  
114 Cf. EU’s Mutual Defence and Solidarity Clauses: Political and Operational Dimensions, EUR. 
PARL. DOC. T7-0456 (2012) (pointing to the utility of TEU art. 42 in “situations where no agreement 
on collective action has been reached within NATO”). 
115 TEU, supra note 1, art. 24(1). 
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III. The Scope of the Commitments 
Once the duty of mutual assistance is triggered, attention turns to the legal 
and practical consequences. Competing considerations pull mutual assistance 
clauses in different directions in this context, too. Their signatories will typically 
seek utmost clarity about the nature and scope of the commitments they have 
undertaken.116 The terms of the bargain must be plain. The parties will want to 
know what is expected of them and, perhaps even more importantly, what they may 
expect from their allies. However, drawing up a detailed catalogue of their mutual 
commitments may be neither practicable nor desirable.117 Doing so could constrain 
a nation’s policy and military options for dealing with a future crisis. Spelling out 
the obligations in detail may also fuel opposition among segments of domestic 
opinion against entering into binding guarantees in the first place, a lesson brought 
home during the drafting of Article 5 NAT. For both political and strategic reasons, 
it may be prudent therefore to specify neither the exact obligations entailed by the 
duty of mutual assistance nor its exact limits, but instead set out only the nature and 
overall outlines of the commitment undertaken by the parties. 
Building on the preceding analysis, the purpose of this section is to assess 
and compare the scope of the substantive obligations imposed by Article 5 NAT, 
Article 42(7) TEU, and Article 222 TFEU and to clarify their binding nature. 
A. Article 5 NAT 
If an armed attack within the meaning of Article 5 NAT against one or more 
Allied nations occurs, each other party is bound to “assist the party or parties so 
attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other parties, such 
action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and 
maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.”118 To fully appreciate all the 
nuances of this text, it is necessary to review its drafting history. 
The negotiating parties drew on two pre-existing texts in drafting Article 5 
NAT.119 The U.S. representatives felt that the proposed agreement should adhere 
as closely as possible to Article 3 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal 
Assistance of 1947,120 known as the Rio Pact. This declares that an armed attack 
against an American state shall be considered as an attack against all the American 
states and commits each of the parties to “assist in meeting the attack” in the 
exercise of the inherent right of self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the 
                                                 
116 Memorandum by the Participants in the Washington Security Talks, supra note 47, at 242. 
117 Minutes of Meeting of the Working Group (Dec. 16, 1948), in 14 DOCUMENTS ON CANADIAN 
EXTERNAL RELATIONS 724–25 (Hector Mackenzie ed., 1948) [hereinafter DCER VOL. XIV]. 
118 NAT, supra note 1, art. 5. 
119 Memorandum by the Participants in the Washington Security Talks, supra note 47, at 247; see 
also Memorandum by Chargé d’Affaires, Embassy in United States (Aug. 26, 1948), in DCER VOL. 
XIV supra note 117, at 548. For a detailed account of the negotiations, see NICHOLAS HENDERSON, 
THE BIRTH OF NATO (1982); LAWRENCE S. KAPLAN, NATO 1948: THE BIRTH OF THE 
TRANSATLANTIC ALLAINCE (2007). 
120 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Sept. 2, 1947, 62 Stat. 1681, 21 U.N.T.S. 77. 
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Charter. By contrast, the European and Canadian representatives favored the 
stronger terms of Article 4 of the original Brussels Treaty of 1948,121 which states 
that in case any of the contracting parties should be the object of an armed attack 
in Europe, the other parties will, in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter, afford 
the victim “all the military and other aid and assistance in their power.”122 As the 
U.S. negotiators emphasized repeatedly, they could not agree to an automatic 
commitment to provide all military and other aid to the victim of an armed attack 
along the lines stipulated by the Brussels Treaty, since under the U.S. Constitution, 
congressional action is required prior to entering into a state of war.123 The other 
representatives thus came to accept that the terms of the Brussels Treaty were “a 
little too stringent to find general acceptance.”124 
By the end of 1948, a draft clause emerged that was modeled largely on the 
Rio Pact, but which also borrowed some of the language of the Brussels Treaty. It 
set out the principle that an attack against one party was to be considered an attack 
against them all and declared that in such an event, each party was to “assist the 
party or parties so attacked by taking forthwith such military or other action, 
individually and in concert with the other parties, as may be necessary to restore 
and assure the security of the North Atlantic area.”125 However, this wording 
proved unacceptable to leading members of the Committee on Foreign Relations of 
the U.S. Senate. Despite reassurances from the Secretary of State, they feared that 
the draft implied an automatic commitment to go to war and therefore suggested 
removing the words “forthwith,” “military,” and “as may be necessary.”126 These 
proposals caused considerable alarm among the Europeans and Canadians, who 
were concerned that the already modest language of the draft was being watered 
down and its deterrent effect eroded.127 Their concerns only grew when further 
objections were raised in an unscheduled Senate debate.128 Efforts to accommodate 
                                                 
121 Commentary on the Washington Paper of September 9, 1948 (Dec. 6, 1948), in DCER VOL. XIV, 
supra note 117, at 703, 708. 
122 Memorandum by the Participants in the Washington Security Talks, supra note 47, at 247. 
123 Memorandum of the Ninth Meeting of the Working Group Participating in the Washington 
Exploratory Talks on Security (Aug. 9, 1948), in FRUS VOL. III, supra note 22, at 209, 211. 
124 Minutes of the Fifth Meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks, supra note 46, at 178. 
125 Report of the International Working Group to the Ambassadors’ Committee (Dec. 24, 1948), in 
FRUS VOL. III, supra note 22, at 333, 335; see also Sir O. Franks (Washington) to Mr. Bevin (Feb. 
4, 1949), in Insall & Salmon, supra note 32, at 370–71. 
126 Memorandum of Conversation with Senator Tom Connally and Senator Arthur Vandenburg 
(Feb. 5, 1949), Acheson Papers (on file at Truman Library), 
https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/achesonmemos/index.php?document
id=65-01_25 [https://perma.cc/K8SM-WM2S]. 
127 Minutes of the Twelfth Meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, supra note 
15, at 73; see also Mr. Bevin to Sir O. Franks (Washington) (Feb. 7, 1949), in Insall & Salmon, 
supra note 32, at 372. 
128 See, e.g., The Proposed North Atlantic Security Pact, 95 CONG. REC. 1163–69 (Feb. 14, 1949); 
Sir O. Franks (Washington) to Mr. Bevin (Feb. 15, 1949), in Insall & Salmon, supra note 32, at 
379–81; Mr. Bevin to Sir O. Franks (Washington) (Feb. 17, 1949), in Insall & Salmon, supra note 
32, at 384; Secretary of State for External Affairs to Ambassador in United States (Feb. 17, 1949), 
in DCER VOL. XV, supra note 32, at 528 (“It is better to have no treaty at all than to have a treaty 
which is so weak and ambiguous as to be meaningless and therefore mischievous.”). 
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the Senators’ objections led the Truman Administration to prepare four alternative 
drafts of the mutual assistance guarantee.129 Following consultations,130 one draft 
was laid before the Committee on Foreign Relations.131 The next day, the European 
and Canadian ambassadors tentatively approved the draft at an informal meeting.132 
The final text of Article 5 NAT, which incorporated further suggestions made by 
the Senate Committee,133 was adopted on March 15, 1949.134 
The drafting history demonstrates that the terms of Article 5 NAT were 
shaped by the overriding need—felt most acutely within the United States, but 
shared by other nations and eventually accepted by all—to avoid any language that 
would automatically commit the parties to use armed force in response to an armed 
attack.135 Going to war remained a national decision.136 This is reflected in the fact 
that unlike the initial draft of late 1948,137 which called for such military or other 
action as may be necessary, the final text explicitly demands only such action as 
the individual contracting parties themselves deem necessary. This point is also 
reinforced by Article 11 NAT, which declares that the NAT’s provisions, including 
Article 5, shall be carried out by the parties in accordance with their respective 
constitutional processes.138 It therefore falls to each contracting party to determine 
how it will respond in case of an attack. 
Given the feeble nature of this obligation, commentators have widely 
questioned the legal value of Article 5 NAT. Not only have they emphasized that 
the text leaves the parties with a wide margin of discretion,139 but many have 
                                                 
129 Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State (Feb. 14, 1949), in FRUS VOL. IV, 
supra note 15, at 108. For the drafts, see Memorandum by the Counsellor of the Department of State 
(Bohlen) to the Secretary of State and the Under Secretary of State (Webb) (Feb. 16, 1949), in FRUS 
VOL. IV, supra note 15, at 113, 115. 
130 Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State (Feb. 17, 1949), in FRUS VOL. IV, 
supra note 15, at 117. 
131 Hearings on Executive L, supra note 22, at 337 (North Atlantic Security Pact); see id. at 105–20 
(The North Atlantic Treaty, Executive Session).  
132 Sir O. Franks (Washington) to Mr. Bevin, (Feb. 19, 1949), in Insall & Salmon, supra note 32, 
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133 Hearings on Executive L, supra note 22, at 131–43 (Informal Session, The North Atlantic 
Treaty). 
134 Minutes of the Eighteenth Meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, supra note 
29, at 222. 
135 See, e.g., Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State (Mar. 14, 1949), in FRUS 
VOL. IV, supra note 15, at 203. 
136 95 CONG REC. 8895, (1949) (Statement of Sen. Vandenberg) (“A commitment to take notice and 
to do something about it is automatic. A commitment to war is not”); see also FOREIGN OFFICE, 
EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE SIGNATURE OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY, WITH A COMMENTARY 
ON THE TEXT, 1949, Cmd. 7692, 5 (UK). 
137 Report of the International Working Group to the Ambassadors’ Committee (Dec. 24, 1948), in 
FRUS VOL. III, supra note 22, at 333, 335. 
138 Any action taken by an Ally to assist another, including the commitment of armed forces, is 
therefore subject to its usual constitutional processes and procedures. See Richard H. Heindel et al., 
The North Atlantic Treaty in the United States Senate, 43 AM. J. INT’L. L. 633, 649–51 (1949). 
139 LORD HASTINGS ISMAY, NATO: THE FIRST FIVE YEARS 1949-1954 13 (1954); J. C. S., 
Problèmes juridiques de l’Organisation du traité de l’Atlantique Nord, 20 POLITIQUE ÉTRANGÈRE 
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suggested that Article 5 entails no legally binding guarantees at all,140 and is only 
of political and practical significance.141 Amongst others, this position has been 
championed by John R. Bolton, the current U.S. National Security Advisor.142 From 
a more formal perspective, it may be questioned whether a commitment which its 
addressees may discharge at their complete discretion amounts to a binding legal 
obligation at all.143 As Senator Claude Pepper remarked during the hearings before 
the Senate Committee, “[i]f you leave it to an agreement which obligates every 
member of it to do what he thinks he ought to do under the circumstances if 
anything arises, it does not seem to me it obligates anybody to do anything 
special.”144 
These points should not be pressed too far, however. It is true that the legal 
significance of certain elements of Article 5 is marginal. The principle that an attack 
against one party is an attack against all amounts to little more than a reaffirmation 
of the right of collective self-defense.145 But this does not mean that Article 5 is 
devoid of legal consequences. The parties have committed themselves to taking 
action, individually and in concert, for the specific purpose of restoring and 
maintaining the security of the North Atlantic area.146 The fact that each nation may 
determine the precise nature of that action means that there is, in the words of 
Michael J. Glennon, an “element of non-commitment in the commitment,”147 
insofar as the use of force is not automatic. But a legal commitment to act 
nonetheless exists.148 One reason for expressing the promise of mutual assistance 
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144 Hearings on Executive L, supra note 22, at 107 (The North Atlantic Treaty, Executive Session). 
145 See Mr. Bevin to Sir O. Franks (Washington) (Feb. 17, 1949), in Insall & Salmon, supra note 32, 
at 384–5 (“This sentence does not bind the United States to any action, but it has great psychological 
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LAW 216–18 (1958). See also infra note 268 and the accompanying text. 
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LEGAL GAZETTE 17, 26 (2014). 
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in the form of an international agreement was precisely to formalize the “natural 
defense relationship” between the negotiating parties in binding terms,149 thereby 
endowing it with an “assurance of permanence” should the political situation 
change.150 
Nor should the discretionary element in Article 5 NAT be overrated.151 The 
assistance provided must be reasonable as measured against the express purpose of 
Article 5 and the overall strategic situation.152 A party that contemplates taking 
action that by its very nature and scope is inadequate for restoring and maintaining 
the security of the North Atlantic area would be in breach of Article 5 just as much 
as a state which refused to take any action at all.153 In this respect, we should 
remember that the parties are bound to perform their obligations under Article 5 in 
good faith.154 U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson thus underlined that each 
nation is committed to do what in its “honest judgment” is necessary to restore and 
maintain the security of the North Atlantic area, taking into account the gravity of 
the armed attack and the action believed to be necessary to achieve this end.155 Sir 
Eric Beckett likewise thought that Article 5 required each party to reach its decision 
“justly and fairly” in the light of the facts and the obligation to give assistance.156 
It also merits noting that a reservation to the ratification of the NAT proposed in 
the U.S. Senate, which would have made the obligation to use force dependent on 
Congressional authorization and declared that the NAT did not oblige or commit 
Congress to authorize the employment of military force, was defeated by an 87–8 
vote.157 This supports the conclusion that at least in certain circumstances, to be 
determined on a case-by-cases basis by each signatory, Article 5 does require the 
employment of military force. 
Accordingly, Article 5 NAT imposes an obligation on the parties to adopt 
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whatever measures, including the use of military force, are necessary, in the 
judgment of each nation, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic 
area. Although in the final analysis the authority to make that judgment lies with 
each individual government,158 the parties are bound to base their decisions on the 
facts, in particular on the gravity of the situation and the measures required to 
achieve the object of Article 5,159 and to provide assistance “on a scale equal to the 
threat.”160 
In discharging these obligations, the parties must take into account any 
relevant prior decisions and commitments they have entered into, such as those 
expressed in summit communiqués and declarations of the North Atlantic 
Council.161 Since the North Atlantic Council proceeds by unanimity, its decisions 
may, in principle, constitute international agreements in simplified form that are 
legally binding on the member states.162 To determine whether or not this is the 
case, regard must be had to the terms of each relevant decision and the 
circumstances of its adoption to establish whether they reveal an intent to enter into 
binding commitments.163 Typically, this is not the case: NATO strategic concepts, 
summit communiqués, and declarations tend not to employ language that is 
indicative of an intent to create legal obligations.164 However, this does not mean 
that such instruments lack legal effects. On the contrary. As the German Federal 
Constitutional Court has recognized with reference to NATO’s Strategic Concept 
of 1999,165 decisions of the North Atlantic Council may constitute subsequent 
agreements or practice between the parties regarding the interpretation of the NAT 
or the application of its provisions, within the meaning of Article 31 of the Vienna 
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Convention on the Law of Treaties.166 Although not formally binding, such 
decisions have to be taken into account in the good faith interpretation and 
application of the NAT. For example, in the Wales Summit Communiqué of 2014, 
the heads of state and government agreed that cyber attacks may fall within the 
scope of Article 5.167 A nation that subsequently questioned this common 
understanding, for instance by refusing to treat a cyber attack as capable of 
engaging its Article 5 commitments, would “justly be considered as violating its 
faith.”168 
B. Article 42(7) TEU 
Before assessing the terms of Article 42(7) TEU, it is necessary to address 
a preliminary matter. At first sight, the existence of a collective self-defense 
commitment within the framework of the TEU is difficult to reconcile with the 
limits of the EU’s competences in the field of defense. Whilst the Union’s 
responsibilities include the progressive framing of a “common defence policy,”169 
they still do not extend to a “common defence.”170 The fact that Article 42(7) 
imposes an obligation on the member states to aid and assist each other in the event 
of armed aggression even though a common defense falls outside the EU’s 
competences thus seems like a contradiction. How can the TEU provide for what 
appears to be a mutual defense guarantee, but at the same time deny the Union’s 
authority in this field?  
This apparent inconsistency has led some experts to query the legal 
character and content of Article 42(7) TEU. Jean-Claude Piris, for example, has 
suggested that Article 42(7) is of “the utmost symbolic and political importance,” 
but does not actually amount to a mutual defense clause.171 Similarly, Panos 
Koutrakos has argued that it must be for each member state to decide how to assist 
a victim of armed aggression, given that the EU is not a military alliance and Article 
42(7) has not transformed it into one.172 In his view, any comparison between 
Article 42(7) on the one hand and Article 5 NAT and Article 5 of the Modified 
Brussels Treaty on the other hand are misplaced.173 
This line of reasoning is not compelling. The TEU entrusts the EU 
institutions with the task of supporting the member states in organizing their 
territorial defense, for instance in the areas of defense capabilities development, 
                                                 
166 VCLT, supra note 154, art. 31. 
167 Press Release, NATO, Wales Summit Declaration: Issued by the Heads of State and Government 
participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales, ¶¶ 72–73 (Sept. 5, 2014). 
168 The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 US 116, 137 (1812). 
169 TEU, supra note 1, art. 24(1). 
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research, acquisition, and armaments.174 In discharging this responsibility, the 
Union must respect the “essential State functions” of its member states, including 
their core function of safeguarding their own territorial integrity.175 Accordingly, 
what distinguishes a common defense policy from a common defense is not the 
respective subject matter of these two sets of activities, given that both deal with 
territorial defense, but the nature of the Union’s involvement in these matters.176 
While the member states have conferred certain limited powers on the EU to 
support their national defense efforts, they have not transferred upon it any 
authority regarding the exercise of the inherent right of individual and collective 
self-defense.177 
Seen from this perspective, there is no contradiction between the lack of 
Union competence over common defense and the existence of a mutual defense 
clause under the TEU, as long as the latter operates on a purely intergovernmental 
basis. In fact, it is clear from its terms that the member states are the sole bearers of 
any rights and obligations under Article 42(7) TEU. No decision-making role is 
foreseen for the institutions,178 which merely serve as a venue for consultations 
among the member states.179 Practice confirms the strictly bilateral character of 
Article 42(7). When France invoked the clause in the aftermath of the Paris attacks 
of November 13, 2015, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy carefully emphasized the bilateral nature of both the French 
request for help and the assistance provided in response.180 She also underlined that 
no formal decision by the Council was required to implement Article 42(7).181 
Accordingly, the scope of the duties imposed by Article 42(7) must be assessed on 
their own terms, rather than on the basis of some a priori conceptions about the 
non-military nature of the EU.  
Although Article 42(7) TEU was meant to restate the commitments 
contained in Article 5 of the Modified Brussels Treaty,182 the text of the two 
provisions is not identical. Whereas Article 5 of the Modified Brussels Treaty 
directed its contracting parties to afford “all the military and other aid and assistance 
in their power” to any other party that has fallen victim to an armed attack, Article 
                                                 
174 TEU, supra note 1, art. 42(3). 
175 Id. art. 4(2). 
176 Mattias G. Fischer & Daniel Thym, Article 42, in TEU, A COMMENTARY, supra note 68, at 1212–
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182 See Brussels Treaty, supra note 72. 
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42(7) omits the words “military and other” from this formula. The TEU thus no 
longer specifies in express terms what form the aid and assistance should take. Yet 
the revised wording does not alter the spectrum of support to be provided, since the 
member states are still bound to use “all the means” in their power. This plainly 
includes military as well as non-military measures.183 The change of wording is 
therefore cosmetic and does not alter the scope of the commitment. 
What remains unclear, however, is the length to which the member states 
must go in providing aid and assistance. Does the obligation to commit all the 
means in their power merely require them to use the full range of capabilities at 
their disposal, including military and non-military means, or does it impose a duty 
to use all available national resources to their full extent? Although both 
interpretations are tenable, the better view is that the duty of aid and assistance 
cannot be unlimited. Not only would this be unrealistic, but it would run counter to 
at least two implicit constraints. First, although not explicitly stated by Article 42(7) 
TEU, its wording and context suggest that the purpose of the duty of assistance is 
to support the victim state in neutralizing the act of armed aggression directed 
against it. The measures to be taken thus depend on the nature and gravity of the 
act of aggression. Second, no member state providing aid and assistance is required 
to jeopardize its own territorial defense. In extreme circumstances, each state is 
entitled to prioritize its own survival.184 In this context, it is worth recalling Sir Eric 
Beckett’s view that each signatory remained free to determine the type of assistance 
to be provided under the original Brussels Treaty.185 
The member states’ duty to provide aid and assistance is also circumscribed 
by the two safeguard clauses found in the second and third sentence of Article 42(7) 
TEU. The first of these provides that the duty of mutual aid and assistance does not 
prejudice the specific character of the security and defense policy of certain 
member states. This clause was designed to allay fears that the participation of 
neutral member states in a collective defense guarantee would be incompatible with 
their non-aligned status. During the negotiation of the Lisbon Treaty, the Austrian, 
Irish, Finnish and Swedish Governments strongly opposed the idea of entering into 
a formally binding security guarantee.186 The safeguard clause preserves the 
position of these member states by adjusting their obligations under Article 42(7) 
TEU. As the Protocol on the Concerns of the Irish People on the Treaty of Lisbon 
states:  
It will be for Member States—including Ireland, acting in a spirit of 
solidarity and without prejudice to its traditional policy of military 
                                                 
183 See Mattias G. Fischer & Daniel Thym, Article 42, in TEU, A COMMENTARY, supra note 68, at 
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184 Cf. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 96 
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185 BECKETT, supra note 79, at 28. 
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neutrality—to determine the nature of aid or assistance to be 
provided to a Member State which is the object of a terrorist attack 
or the victim of armed aggression on its territory.187 
The Protocol confirms that all member states are free to determine the 
nature of the aid or assistance to be provided to another member state. However, 
only those member states which follow a traditional policy of neutrality may 
decline to provide military or other non-neutral assistance in cases where the 
gravity of the situation would otherwise call for a military response. This is so 
because the safeguard clause as worded in Article 42(7) is limited to “certain 
Member States.” Given its genesis, this group includes Austria, Ireland, Finland, 
and Sweden.188 The other member states remain committed to employing the full 
range of instruments at their disposal, including armed force, as they deem 
necessary in the light of the circumstances of each particular case. 
The second safeguard clause addresses the relationship between Article 
42(7) TEU and the NAT.189 It provides that “[c]ommitments and cooperation in this 
area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the 
foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation.”190 In 
short, the clause accords primacy to commitments undertaken within NATO over 
commitments and cooperation arising under the common defense policy of the 
EU.191 This reflects the obligation that the member states of NATO have assumed 
in Article 8 NAT, which bars them from entering into international agreements in 
conflict with the NAT. The second safeguard clause incorporates this principle into 
the TEU and thus cements the primacy of NATO. 
Whilst the basic principle is clear enough, its application in practice is a 
different matter. The fact that NATO commitments enjoy priority does not preclude 
the parallel implementation of commitments and cooperation under the TEU, as 
long as the latter are consistent with the former. The member states of the EU owe 
the duty of consistency towards each other, not towards NATO. Whether or not 
                                                 
187 Protocol on the concerns of the Irish people on the Treaty of Lisbon, art. 3, June 12, 2012, 2013 
O.J. (L 60) 131. 
188 See FREDERIK NAERT, INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS OF THE EU’S SECURITY AND DEFENCE 
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their mutual cooperation within the framework of Article 42(7) TEU is compatible 
with commitments under NATO is therefore a matter to be determined by them. 
Accordingly, an EU member state’s decision to invoke Article 42(7) is not 
dependent on the prior approval of NATO.192 However, it is not clear whether such 
a decision must be preceded by consultations within the EU.193 It would certainly 
be prudent for the member states to consult each other before invoking and 
implementing Article 42(7).194 Support for the idea that they are under a legal duty 
to do so may be derived from Article 32 TEU, which requires the member states to 
show mutual solidarity and to consult one another “on any matter of foreign and 
security policy of general interest in order to determine a common approach.” 
Ensuring that the implementation of Article 42(7) is compatible with the 
commitments that certain EU member states have undertaken within NATO should 
be seen as a matter of general interest requiring consultation. 
C. Article 222 TFEU 
In contrast to the strictly bilateral character of Article 42(7) TEU, the 
solidarity clause set out in Article 222 TFEU operates on two distinct levels.195 
First, Article 222(1) imposes an obligation on the Union and the member states to 
“act jointly in a spirit of solidarity.” The brunt of this obligation is borne by the EU 
itself, since Article 222(1) specifically stipulates that the “Union shall mobilize all 
the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by 
the Member States.” However, since the Union does not enjoy exclusive 
competence in all policy areas where action may be appropriate,196 additional steps 
by the member states may be required, in particular in the field of the Common 
Security and Defence Policy.197 This explains why responsibility for the 
implementation of Article 222(1) is shared between the Union and the member 
states. In addition, Article 222(2) imposes a separate obligation on the member 
states to assist another member state, at the request of its political authorities, that 
is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster. 
This obligation operates on a bilateral level, just like Article 42(7) TEU. 
Turning to the scope of these two sets of obligations, Article 222(1)(a) 
TFEU requires the Union to mobilize “all the instruments at its disposal” to pursue 
three objectives: prevent the terrorist threat in the territory of the member states; 
protect democratic institutions and the civilian population from any terrorist attack; 
and assist a member state in its territory, at the request of its political authorities, in 
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the event of a terrorist attack. Although not expressly stated, only those instruments 
capable of making an effective contribution towards realizing one or more of these 
objectives need to be mobilized.198 In this respect, the EU institutions should take 
into account the nature of the crisis, the needs of the affected member state(s), and 
the suitability of the instruments available to the Union. In addition to taking action 
in response to terrorist attacks, Article 222(1)(b) directs the Union to assist a 
member state in its territory, at the request of its political authorities, in the event 
of a natural or man-made disaster. Depending on the nature of the crisis, Article 
222(1)(a) and (b) may demand the use of a wide range of instruments,199 including 
both immediate and long-term measures. They may include civil protection and 
other emergency responses,200 instruments strengthening the protection of critical 
infrastructures in energy and transport,201 and cooperation in law enforcement.202 
Since coordinating these tools is key to an effective response, Decision 
2014/415/EU entrusts the Council with the political and strategic direction of the 
Union’s activities.203 
Compared to the Union’s responsibilities, the obligations imposed on the 
member states are less extensive and less detailed.204 Article 222(2) TFEU merely 
stipulates that the member states shall assist the victim state and shall coordinate 
between themselves in the Council to this end. Although Article 222(2) does not 
specify in express terms what aims and objectives this assistance should pursue, the 
goal surely is to support the affected member state in mitigating the effects of an 
attack or disaster. As far as the scope of this duty is concerned, Declaration 37 
annexed to the Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference which adopted the 
Treaty of Lisbon declares that nothing in Article 222 is intended to affect the right 
of one member state “to choose the most appropriate means to comply with its own 
solidarity obligation” towards another member state.205 The same point also 
emerges from the Protocol on the Concerns of the Irish People on the Treaty of 
Lisbon, at least in so far as terrorist attacks are concerned.206 Unlike the Union, the 
member states therefore enjoy a broad margin of discretion in selecting the 
instruments through which they may discharge their own solidarity obligation.207 
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The scope of this discretion is not unlimited, however. The assisting member states 
must choose means that are “appropriate” to discharge their obligations.208 At a 
minimum, the assistance rendered must address the demands of the situation and 
do so with a degree of effectiveness. This may require the use of military means.209 
It must also be borne in mind that the member states are subject to a general duty 
to “work together to enhance and develop their mutual political solidarity.”210 Since 
Article 222 is one of the most prominent manifestations of this general principle,211 
the member states must approach their obligations in a spirit of mutual solidarity.  
Finally, it should be noted that the member states’ duty to assist under 
Article 222(2) is not automatic, but is engaged only if the political authorities of 
the affected member state issue a request to this effect. By contrast, the Union’s 
obligation to mobilise all the instruments at its disposal under Article 222(1) is 
engaged automatically upon a member state becoming the object of a terrorist 
attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster. 
D. Comparison 
The three provisions discussed in the preceding section all impose 
obligations of aid and assistance, but the content and scope of these obligations 
varies. Article 5 NAT, Article 42(7) TEU, and Article 222 TFEU require the states 
concerned to consider the use of both military and non-military means of aid and 
assistance. At first sight, Article 42(7) appears to place greater demands on the 
member states of the EU in this respect compared to the obligations that Article 5 
imposes on the members of NATO. Whereas Article 42(7) stipulates that EU 
member states must assist a victim of armed aggression “by all the means in their 
power,” Article 5 merely directs the parties to take whatever action they deem 
necessary. However, as we have seen, the Protocol on the Concerns of the Irish 
People recognizes that the EU member states are free to determine the nature of 
their aid and assistance under both Article 42(7) and Article 222. All three 
provisions thus defer, in the first instance, to the discretion of the assisting parties 
to choose the most appropriate forms of assistance. The German Federal 
Constitutional Court was therefore correct to hold that the obligation of assistance 
under Article 42(7) does not exceed the obligations pursuant to Article 5.212  
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Nevertheless, the European mutual assistance clauses are subject to 
additional limitations and exceptions. In the case of Article 42(7) TEU, the exercise 
of national discretion in the choice of the means and methods of assistance is 
subject to the two safeguard clauses set out in that provision. Since EU member 
states pursuing a traditional policy of neutrality are not bound to undertake steps 
that are incompatible with their neutral status, these states may decline to provide 
military support or to undertake other steps that would constitute non-neutral 
acts.213 In addition, all EU member states must ensure that any assistance they 
provide in this context is consistent with commitments in NATO. For example, if 
the Transatlantic and European mutual defense clauses were to be engaged at the 
same time, whether in relation to the same incident or not, those EU member states 
that are also members of NATO would be entitled to prioritize their efforts within 
the framework of the Alliance.  
A further limitation arises under Article 222(1) TFEU. Although Article 
222(1) specifically directs the Union to mobilize the military resources made 
available by its member states, Decision 2014/415/EU provides that the 
arrangements for the implementation of this obligation are without defense 
implications.214 This reflects the fact that a “common defence” does not form part 
of the EU’s competences at this point in time. As a consequence, the Union may 
employ military resources under Article 222(1) only for the purposes of civil 
protection and related activities inside the territory of its member states,215 or for 
crisis management missions outside their national territory.216 However, it may not 
mobilize military resources for the purposes of individual or collective self-
defense.217 By contrast, no such limitation applies to the member states acting 
pursuant to Article 222(2) TFEU: assistance provided by the member states under 
this provision may have defense implications. In fact, where a terrorist attack or a 
man-made disaster amounts to an armed attack or aggression, Article 222(2) may 
apply in parallel with Article 5 NAT and Article 42(7) TEU. Any military 
assistance provided within the framework of Article 222 is not subject to the duty 
to ensure its compatibility with commitments undertaken within NATO.218 
Finally, the objectives pursued by the three provisions also differ. Neither 
Article 42(7) TEU nor Article 222(2) TFEU identify what exact purpose the aid 
and assistance offered under these two provisions is meant to pursue. Perhaps this 
was considered too obvious a point to spell out in express terms. Evidently, the 
objective is to address the threat posed by the act of armed aggression, terrorist 
attack, or a natural or man-made disaster. If so, this means that the duty to render 
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assistance under Article 42(7) and Article 222(2) expires once this objective has 
been achieved. By contrast, Article 5 NAT requires the parties to take action in 
order to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. This obligation 
may still be engaged in situations where the parties have successfully beaten back 
an aggressor, but where the threat to the security of the North Atlantic area has not 
been fully eliminated. In such cases, Article 5 may demand continued military and 
non-military measures, for instance further steps designed to deter the defeated 
adversary. 
IV. Hybrid Threats 
As originally conceived, the term “hybrid warfare” was meant to express 
the idea that distinct modes of warfighting, acts of terrorism, and criminality are 
converging to produce a hybrid form of war.219 According to proponents of the 
concept, state and non-state adversaries are increasingly deploying an integrated 
mix of conventional capabilities and irregular tactics in the same battlespace in 
order to achieve synergistic effects, thereby fusing the “lethality of state conflict 
with the fanatical and protracted fervor of irregular warfare.”220 The initial impact 
of these ideas was modest. They inspired further work on the implications of 
hybridity,221 including within NATO,222 but left only a minor impression on 
military doctrine.223 
Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its intervention in eastern 
Ukraine, the concept rapidly gained wider traction. To many observers, Russia’s 
potent cocktail of military force, political subversion, and plausible deniability 
looked like a textbook example of hybrid warfare.224 NATO quickly adopted the 
term. In response to the events in Ukraine, its member states resolved to “ensure 
that NATO is able to effectively address the specific challenges posed by hybrid 
warfare threats, where a wide range of overt and covert military, paramilitary, and 
civilian measures are employed in a highly integrated design.”225 In December 
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2015, the North Atlantic Council adopted a Hybrid Warfare Strategy focusing on 
preparedness, deterrence, and defense.226 The concept also attracted the attention 
of the EU. In a paper prepared in May 2015, the European External Action Service 
recommended that the EU should develop a Union-wide strategy to counter hybrid 
threats that would be complementary to NATO’s efforts.227 Building on this, in 
April 2016, the High Representative and the European Commission presented a 
Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats containing a set of proposals for 
preventing, responding to, and recovering from hybrid threats.228 
As it grew in popularity, the concept of hybrid warfare has taken on a 
broader meaning.229 Today, the term is employed mostly to refer to the 
synchronized use of multiple levers of power by state and non-state actors to exploit 
another nation’s or organization’s vulnerabilities across the full spectrum of its 
societal functions.230 By using a combination of coercive and non-coercive 
measures to target the political, military, economic, social, informational, and 
infrastructure vulnerabilities of a state or international organization, hybrid 
adversaries are able to avoid open military confrontation and achieve incremental 
strategic gains.231 The notion of hybrid warfare has thus evolved from a relatively 
narrow idea designed to describe the changing character of warfare into a more 
amorphous notion about the nature and modalities of contemporary strategic 
competition. This development has not gone without criticism. Many 
commentators believe that the looser, now dominant, understanding of hybrid 
warfare offers few analytical insights.232 
Against this background, the purpose of this section is to identify the legal 
challenges typically associated with hybrid threats, assess their implications for the 
Transatlantic and European mutual assistance clauses, and determine how the 
strategies of legal subversion and erosion that may be deployed as part of a hybrid 
campaign should be countered. 
                                                 
226 Jens Stoltenberg, NATO Secretary General, Press Conference following the meeting of the North 
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A. The legal dimension of hybrid warfare 
Seen from a legal perspective, the concept of hybrid warfare draws attention 
to two sets of difficulties. The original understanding of the term shines a spotlight 
on the legal challenges posed by complex military operations that involve diverse 
lines of effort, such as warfighting, security assistance, and post-conflict 
reconstruction. Such military deployments are governed by multiple legal regimes 
and raise difficult questions about the interaction between diverse branches of the 
law, in particular the law of armed conflict and international human rights law.233 
However, few of these difficulties are new. They already featured prominently 
during the counter-insurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.234 The lesson to 
draw from a hybrid warfare perspective is not that these are novel developments, 
but that the legal difficulties surrounding counter-insurgency operations and other 
complex military deployments are likely to become a permanent fixture of future 
conflict more generally, including peer-to-peer confrontation. 
By contrast, hybrid warfare understood more broadly as multimodal 
strategic competition brings into focus the legal thresholds that separate lawful, 
though unfriendly, measures of international intercourse from unlawful acts of 
intervention, use of force, and armed attack. Many commentators thus consider the 
application of the rules governing the use of force, including the exercise of the 
right of individual and collective self-defense, to be among the most pressing legal 
questions raised by hybrid threats.235 Indeed, it is these questions that have 
preoccupied NATO and the EU, rather than the legal challenges associated with 
hybrid forms of war in the narrow sense. Two overarching themes emerge from the 
relevant policy documents and statements adopted by the two organizations. 
First, hybrid adversaries are said to deploy law and legal arguments in an 
effort to gain an operational or strategic advantage. They exploit the lack of legal 
interoperability and consensus among Western nations by capitalizing on “different 
interpretations and national restrictions in areas such as (but not limited to) 
international law and lethal engagement.”236 They circumvent legal boundaries and 
thresholds to avoid triggering the applicability of mutual assistance commitments: 
Specifically, actors will operate below NATO’s Article 5 threshold 
of an attack against NATO member states. By operating below 
                                                 
233 See generally KENNETH WATKIN, FIGHTING AT THE LEGAL BOUNDARIES: CONTROLLING THE USE 
OF FORCE IN CONTEMPORARY CONFLICT (2016). 
234 See generally WILLIAM BANKS, COUNTERINSURGENCY LAW: NEW DIRECTIONS IN ASYMMETRIC 
WARFARE (2013); GANESH SITARAMAN, THE COUNTERINSURGENT’S CONSTITUTION: LAW IN THE 
AGE OF SMALL WARS (2013). It has been suggested that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan should be 
understood as hybrid wars. See Josef Schroefl & Stuart J. Kaufman, Hybrid Actors, Tactical Variety: 
Rethinking Asymmetric and Hybrid War, 37 STUD. IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 862, 866–69 (2014). 
235 See, e.g., Douglas Cantwell, Hybrid Warfare: Aggression and Coercion in the Gray Zone, 21 
AMER. SOC. INT’L L. INSIGHTS (Nov. 29, 2017), 
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NATO’s threshold of response, an adversary can potentially enable 
continuous, incremental progress without the risk of large setbacks 
due to significant military action. They can also potentially 
undermine the legitimacy of a NATO response.237 
Hybrid adversaries also generate and exploit ambiguity:  
A critically important aspect of hybrid warfare is to generate 
ambiguity both in the affected population under attack and in the 
larger international community. The aim is to mask what is actually 
happening on the ground in order to obscure the differentiation 
between war and peace. This ambiguity, the lack of full attribution, 
can paralyse the ability of an opponent to react effectively and 
mobilize defences as it becomes unclear who is behind an attack. 
Even more, ambiguity can divide the international community, 
limiting the speed and scope of a response to the aggression.238 
Second, it is widely believed that the dividing line between war and peace 
is fading. This development is sometimes seen as a by-product of the hybridization 
of warfare.239 For example, Gavin Williamson, the British Secretary of Defence, 
has suggested that the difference between war and peace is diminishing as a result 
of “states adopting the tactics of terrorists and terrorists increasingly armed with 
sophisticated weapons.”240 Jens Stoltenberg, the Secretary General of NATO, has 
argued that with the expansion of conflict into the cyber domain and the prevalence 
of high-intensity non-international armed conflicts, the line between war and peace 
has become more blurred.241 Occasionally, this development is perceived as a more 
deliberate process. In a speech delivered at the European Parliament in October 
2015, General Petr Pavel, then Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, blamed 
Russia for clouding the distinction between the traditional concepts of war and 
peace.242 Similarly, in their Brussels summit communiqué of July 2018, NATO 
leaders took note of the increasing challenges posed by states and non-state actors 
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242 Petr Pavel, Chairman of NATO Military Committee, speech at the European Parliament: Current 
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444 
Harvard National Security Journal / Vol. 10 
“who use hybrid activities that aim to create ambiguity and blur the lines between 
peace, crisis, and conflict.”243 
Taken together, these statements reveal a deep-seated concern that future 
adversaries will compete below the threshold of war by employing a blend of tactics 
and instruments deliberately designed to avoid open armed confrontation. By 
operating in this manner, they may succeed in circumventing the Transatlantic and 
European mutual assistance clauses and achieve their strategic objectives without 
triggering an effective response. To determine whether these concerns are justified, 
we must assess to what extent the three mutual assistance clauses are vulnerable to 
strategies of subversion.  
B. Legal vulnerabilities 
Classic mutual defense arrangements are triggered when an adversary 
crosses a red line. In the case of Article 5 NAT and Article 42(7) TEU, the duty to 
provide assistance is engaged by an armed attack or an act of armed aggression. 
Since the threshold for an armed attack is higher than the threshold for the use of 
force,244 a hybrid adversary may exploit the gap that lies between these legal fault 
lines by conducting its operations at a level of intensity below that of an armed 
attack.245 This way, it may reap the benefit of using force, especially in combination 
with other non-forcible measures, without triggering the duty of mutual assistance 
under Article 5 and Article 42(7).  
China’s activities in the South China Sea illustrate this tactic. In recent 
years, China has asserted its maritime interests by advancing a series of legal claims 
and taking a variety of practical measures, ranging from island-building, base-
construction, and an increased naval presence, to extend its control over the South 
China Seas.246 China asserts and enforces its maritime claims by deploying a 
mixture of civilian fishing crafts, maritime law enforcement vessels, and warships. 
Frontline operations such as blockades, harassment, and monitoring are conducted 
mainly by civilian and coast guard vessels,247 while Chinese navy vessels remain 
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in the background to form a second line of capabilities.248 Chinese civilian, 
paramilitary, and military assets thus operate in an integrated and mutually 
reinforcing manner: frontline vessels are able to conduct aggressive operations 
because the presence of second-line forces discourages other nations from 
responding more robustly and thereby running the risk of escalation. Meanwhile, 
land-reclamation and base-construction activities enable China to maintain a 
continuous naval presence in the area and to increase its ability to project power.249 
By deploying a mutually reinforcing blend of capabilities, China is able to exercise 
low-intensity coercion from a position of escalation dominance,250 which in turn 
enables it to achieve its strategic goals whilst avoiding open military 
confrontation.251 
However, there are limits to this tactic of operating below the threshold of 
open conflict. Hostile actions that do not exceed the severity of “mere frontier 
incidents,”252 such as confrontations and other incidents at sea,253 will produce only 
limited effects. They may demonstrate a hybrid actor’s resolve, but they are 
unlikely to achieve lasting results, especially if they remain isolated acts. For 
example, in July 2008, four Russian military aircraft violated Georgia’s airspace.254 
Whilst this show of strength may have succeeded in deterring the Georgian 
Government, at least temporarily, from asserting its control over the break-away 
republic of South Ossetia,255 Russia was unable to avoid recourse to armed force 
on a far greater scale during the ensuing Russo-Georgian War in order to tilt the 
balance decisively in favor of the Abkhaz and South Ossetian separatists.256 While 
the gravity threshold of an armed attack affords hybrid adversaries with some 
opportunities to utilize their armed forces and other national assets without 
triggering the applicability of Article 5 and Article 42(7), in particular in the 
preparatory phases of a larger conflict, more often than not that the military benefits 
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are likely to be moderate. 
Whereas the direct use of force by an adversary below the threshold of an 
armed attack may not achieve lasting effects, the indirect use of force may offer 
more lucrative rewards. The International Court of Justice has rejected the idea that 
the supply of weapons or logistical support to rebels qualifies as an armed attack.257 
Taken at face value, the Court’s categorical ruling implies that not even the 
provision of extensive and mission critical military assistance to separatists would 
trigger Article 5 NAT and Article 42(7) TEU, as long as the hybrid state adversary 
avoided exercising effective control over the groups concerned. A state may train 
and equip rebel forces, airlift them into battle, share critical intelligence, supply 
strategic weapons, and coordinate its own operations with their movements without 
any of these activities, either alone or in combination, surpassing the threshold of 
an armed attack.258  
Supporting proxy forces and acting through intermediaries also promises 
other benefits to a hybrid adversary.259 Indirect forms of aggression hamper efforts 
to attribute hostile activities to a state. While it is now broadly recognized that the 
right of self-defense extends to armed attacks emanating from non-state actors,260 
this point is not universally accepted. In addition, the use of force against non-state 
groups present in the territory of third states runs into considerable legal difficulties, 
above all the controversial “unable or unwilling” standard.261 Invoking Article 5 
NAT and Article 42(7) TEU against non-state actors located abroad is therefore 
bound to provoke legal and political objections in situations where clear and 
compelling evidence that they are operating under the control of another state is 
lacking.262 Indeed, should proxy forces be located in the territory of the state 
targeted by a hybrid campaign without sufficient evidence linking them to a third 
state, Article 5 and Article 42(7) may not be available at all, due to the lack of a 
cross-border dimension.263 The involvement of proxy forces also presents 
difficulties for conflict classification,264 exposing the targeted state to potential 
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challenges over the extent and nature of its legal authority to conduct offensive 
operations under the law of non-international armed conflict.265 Overall, using 
indirect force below the threshold of an armed attack presents hybrid adversaries 
with ample opportunities to exploit legal thresholds, gaps, and gray areas and may 
even produce more valuable strategic effects than using force directly. 
The application of Article 5 NAT and Article 42(7) TEU is subject not only 
to a legal threshold, but also a political one.266 In principle, the two clauses are 
engaged automatically once an armed attack or an act of armed aggression takes 
place. In practice, however, their application depends on a positive assessment by 
the parties that such an attack or act has in fact occurred.267 In addition, the use of 
force in the exercise of the right of collective self-defense is not lawful unless the 
state that regards itself the victim of an armed attack has issued a request for 
assistance.268 Practice over the last seventy years demonstrates that Article 5 will 
not be invoked lightly. Activating the mutual defense commitment has escalatory 
potential, particularly in response to threats posed by peer competitors.269 As a 
command paper presented by the British Government to Parliament put it, “[i]n 
order to obtain the assistance of the other parties, the party attacked must be able to 
convince them that the attack is of such a nature that its independence and integrity 
are threatened.”270 The same point also applies to Article 42(7). If circumstances 
permit, it is therefore likely that a hybrid adversary will attempt to employ force at 
a level or in a manner that does not unambiguously amount to an armed attack, so 
as to deter the targeted state from invoking Article 5 or Article 42(7), to prevent a 
consensus from forming within NATO and the EU as to whether the threshold of 
an armed attack has been crossed, and to minimize the level of aid and assistance 
offered by other nations should Article 5 or Article 42(7) be invoked after all. 
Although perhaps not entirely immune to such manipulation, Article 222 
TFEU is less exposed to tactics of subversion than either Article 5 NAT or Article 
42(7) TEU. This is so because the conditions that trigger its applicability—the 
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existence or threat of terrorist attack or natural or man-made disaster—are less 
demanding, leaving EU member states with greater discretion and hybrid 
adversaries with fewer gaps to exploit. As we saw earlier, Council Decision 
2014/415/EU defines “terrorist attacks” for the purposes of Article 222 to mean 
“terrorist offenses” as defined in Directive 2017/541 on combating terrorism. The 
list of terrorist offenses set out in Directive 2017/541 is comprehensive, covering 
both the actual commission of a wide range of acts and the threat to commit them.271 
To qualify as terrorist offenses, and thus as terrorist attacks for the purposes of 
Article 222, these acts must be committed intentionally and in pursuit of one of the 
terrorist aims identified in Directive 2017/541.272 These two requirements do not, 
however, provide hybrid adversaries with much room to exploit. While the terrorist 
intent and aim must be established with reference to objective criteria,273 Directive 
2017/541 does not demand that they be imputed to a state. Moreover, while the 
effects pursued by two of the terrorist aims must be “serious,”274 the Directive 
nowhere defines what level of severity is required. This leaves the member states 
free to make that judgment on a case-by-case basis. As far as man-made disasters 
are concerned, we saw that this term covers “any situation which has or may have 
a severe impact on people, the environment or property, including cultural 
heritage.”275 Save for the requirement of severity, it is difficult to envisage a more 
elastic trigger for the application of Article 222. 
Accordingly, the language of Article 222 TFEU leaves the member states 
of the EU with considerable latitude to invoke the duty of mutual aid and assistance. 
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Since the concepts of “terrorist attack” and “man-made disaster” are not borrowed 
from general international law, unlike the term “armed attack” and “armed 
aggression” found in Article 5 NAT and Article 42(7) TEU, the member states 
enjoy greater freedom to interpret them as they see fit. This significantly reduces 
the likelihood that a hybrid adversary may be able to deliberately circumvent the 
trigger mechanisms of Article 222. The European Parliament too has expressed 
itself in favor of a flexible approach in defining the type of attacks and disasters 
covered by this clause, so as to ensure “that no significant threats, such as attacks 
in cyberspace, pandemics, or energy shortages, are overlooked.”276 The European 
Parliament has also taken the view that whilst Article 222 should be reserved for 
situations that overwhelm the response capacities of the affected member state or 
require a multisector response, “once a Member State has decided to invoke the 
clause, it should not be a matter for debate for the others to offer assistance.”277 On 
this view, it is for the affected member state to decide whether or not the severity 
threshold is met. 
Strategic Implications 
The vulnerability of Article 5 NAT and Article 42(7) TEU to subversive 
tactics has two consequences. First, should a hybrid adversary succeed in exploiting 
their shortcomings, the utility of these two provisions as a framework for mounting 
an effective military response to counter hybrid threats could be severely 
compromised, either because a hybrid adversary might render them formally 
unavailable by operating below their threshold of applicability or because it might 
foil the emergence of a political consensus in favor of invoking them where they 
are in fact applicable as a matter of law. Second, the very prospect of successfully 
circumventing Article 5 and Article 42(7) reduces their deterrent effect.  
It is important to appreciate that the bar for success in circumventing Article 
5 NAT and Article 42(7) TEU is not necessarily high. The primary goal of a hybrid 
adversary is not to convince an expert audience that its activities do not amount to 
an armed attack or an act of armed aggression. Rather, its goal is to prevent the 
targeted state and its allies from making a compelling case that invoking Article 5 
or Article 42(7) would be a lawful, legitimate, and prudent response to the threats 
they are facing. A plausible narrative that casts doubt on these points among 
domestic and international audiences might suffice to achieve that objective.278 
States craft legal storylines to support their national security objectives on a regular 
basis.279 Although the idea that such verbal strategies are as important as military 
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strategies may push the point too far,280 the significance of legal narratives and 
counter-narratives for opening up certain courses of action and for foreclosing 
others must not be underestimated. If anything, the progressive legalization of the 
conduct of foreign affairs and the vastly increased public interest in the legality of 
military action,281 amplified by social media,282 has boosted the impact of legal 
justifications. Assessing the potential vulnerabilities of the Transatlantic and 
European collective security arrangements from a narrow black letter perspective 
therefore risks misjudging their susceptibility to hostile strategic communication. 
Nevertheless, the threat of subversion should not be overrated, either. In 
particular, the widespread unease over the blurring of the line between war and 
peace must be put into perspective. Hybrid warfare in its original, narrow sense 
describes a style of operational art: the integrated use of conventional and 
unconventional methods of warfighting in the same battlespace. Armed conflict, 
whether actual or impending, is integral to the concept. By contrast, hybrid warfare 
in its broader sense describes the use of the full range of instruments by hostile 
actors in pursuit of their strategic goals. Here, hybrid warfare no longer refers to a 
method of waging war, but to the combination of diverse levers of influence for the 
purposes of geopolitical competition. Hard power and the threat of military 
confrontation remain essential components of the concept, but actual or imminent 
hostilities do not. Describing non-forcible measures carried out by hostile powers 
as hybrid warfare may be justified in circumstances where these activities 
constitute shaping operations in anticipation of armed conflict or where they form 
part of ongoing hostilities.283 However, in the absence of any realistic connection 
with actual or impeding war, labeling such measures as acts of warfare, whether 
hybrid or not, is a misnomer.284 It may convey the hostile nature of geopolitical 
confrontation,285 but it is still hyperbole. The dividing line between war and peace 
may look blurred when it is viewed from the perspective of a wide understanding 
of hybrid warfare, but this is so largely because the very use of the concept in such 
a loose manner creates a link between non-forcible acts falling below the threshold 
of war and the mere prospect of war.286 Russian theorists of contemporary conflict 
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have avoided such conceptual freefall by insisting that violence is an integral 
element of warfare.287 
Since hybrid warfare in a broad sense does not necessarily involve armed 
violence, the question arises whether mutual defense clauses should be considered 
as implicated in such circumstances at all. There are compelling reasons to answer 
in the negative. On their own, acts of hostile interference not entailing the use of 
force are unlikely to subvert Article 5 NAT or Article 42(7) TEU. As Russia’s 
interventions in Georgia and Ukraine demonstrate, there is little evidence that non-
military instruments have rendered the use of armed force redundant. Tweets do 
not seize ground—infantry battalions do. Since states are not capable of achieving 
traditional military objectives, such as seizing and holding ground, without 
employing armed force, they are not able to circumvent mutual defense guarantees 
by limiting themselves solely to non-forcible measures. At the same time, the fact 
that specific incidents are not caught by Article 5 or Article 42(7) does not 
necessarily point to a flaw in their design. Take, for example, the attempted murder 
of Sergei Skripal with a chemical nerve agent in Salisbury on March 4, 2018, an 
act which the British Government declared to be an unlawful use of force.288 While 
commentators are divided as to whether the incident did in fact amount to the use 
of force,289 they concur that it certainly did not reach the level of an armed attack.290 
Indeed, the UK and its allies studiously refrained from describing it as an armed 
attack.291 The Salisbury incident thus escaped the reach of Article 5. Yet this is not 
the result of some drafting deficiency, but reflects the fact that not every security 
challenge gives rise to the right of self-defense under international law.292 Similarly, 
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the fact that Chinese warships support the frontline operations of Chinese civilian 
and coast guard vessels in the South China Seas by providing a deterrent effect does 
not mean that their mere presence constitutes an armed attack. Nor should we 
assume that military force is an appropriate and effective response to every type of 
threat.293 There are plenty of hostile actions in response to which it would be 
unreasonable to use force—either because doing so would be disproportionate to 
the threat, and thus morally and politically unpalatable, or because it would carry a 
real risk of escalation with limited prospects of compelling the adversary to submit 
to our will, or both. 
Accordingly, the danger that hybrid threats may bypass Article 5 NAT and 
Article 42(7) TEU does not lie at the two extremes: the possibility that non-forcible 
instruments may render the use of armed force redundant at one end or that 
individual low-intensity incidents may fail to trigger the right to use force in self-
defense at the other. Rather, the danger lies in the indirect use of force and in its 
combination with non-military levers of influence in a way that avoids Article 5 
and Article 42(7) being triggered in precisely those situations where a forcible 
response would be politically warranted, legally admissible, and militarily 
effective. 
Countering the challenges 
The legal challenges that hybrid threats present for collective security 
guarantees have been recognized at the highest political level. At their Warsaw 
summit held in July 2016, NATO’s member states confirmed their readiness to 
assist each other at any stage of a hybrid campaign and to counter hybrid warfare 
as part of collective defense.294 They also underscored that the North Atlantic 
Council “could decide to invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.”295 They 
repeated these points at their Brussels summit in July 2018.296 By drawing an 
express link between hybrid warfare and collective defense, NATO leaders 
signaled their resolve not to allow Article 5 to be hollowed out.297 Still, their 
declarations of intent strike a rather conservative note. Whilst they accept that 
NATO may assist an Ally at any stage of a “hybrid campaign,” it is only in cases 
of “hybrid warfare” that they foresee a potential role for Article 5. This is not an 
unreasonable position to take. As we saw earlier, recourse to the use of force to 
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counter hybrid threats falling below the threshold of an armed attack is neither 
permissible nor necessarily appropriate. A pledge to invoke the mutual defense 
commitment in response to every type of hybrid threat would be a promise to use 
the proverbial sledgehammer to crack a nut. It would be unrealistic and therefore 
lack credibility in the eyes of hybrid adversaries.298 By accepting that the role of 
Article 5 is confined to situations of hybrid warfare, the Warsaw and Brussels 
Summit Declarations avoid such empty gestures. However, in the same breath they 
also concede that the application of Article 5 is contingent on the legal threshold 
between warfare and peace, and thus vulnerable to subversion along the lines 
discussed in the preceding sections. 
It may be tempting to deal with the problem of legal thresholds by 
attempting to escape them altogether, but this is not a feasible strategy. Even if the 
contracting parties were to revise Article 5 NAT and Article 42(7) TEU to avoid 
references to “armed attack” and “armed aggression,”299 they would remain bound 
by the rules governing the use of force under the UN Charter and customary 
international law. Although the member states of NATO and the EU make up an 
influential part of the international community, it is not within their ability to adjust 
these general rules of international law unilaterally. In any event, lowering the 
threshold for the use of force in order to facilitate the application of Article 5 and 
Article 42(7) would come with significant costs, since it would loosen the legal 
restrictions for all states, including hostile powers. The applicable thresholds 
therefore cannot be unilaterally modified at will and without the risk of unraveling 
key elements of the international legal order as it currently stands. 
A more promising approach is to strengthen legal interoperability among 
NATO and EU nations. One line of effort is to reduce legal gray zones,300 for 
example by narrowing disagreements over the gap that lies between the definition 
of force and armed attack. This could prepare the ground for developing a shared 
understanding of what kind of hybrid threats may trigger the applicability of Article 
5 NAT and Article 42(7) TEU. Given that the assessment of any security threat 
depends heavily on its context, it may prove somewhat sterile to build such a 
consensus in the abstract. Drawing on war-gaming and exercises may offer a more 
fruitful way forward. Bearing in mind how attractive the use of proxies is to a hybrid 
state adversary,301 developing a common approach to attribute their activities to the 
                                                 
298 WILLIAM W. KAUFMANN, THE REQUIREMENTS OF DETERRENCE 6–12 (1954); ROBERT E. 
OSGOOD, LIMITED WAR: THE CHALLENGE TO AMERICAN STRATEGY 242 (1957); BERNARD BRODIE, 
STRATEGY IN THE MISSILE AGE 239 (1959). 
299 Lord Jopling, Countering Russia’s Hybrid Threats: An Update, NATO Parliamentary Assembly 
Committee on the Civil Dimension of Security, ¶ 77 (Oct. 1, 2018); Maria Mälksoo, Countering 
Hybrid Warfare as Ontological Security Management: The Emerging Practices of the EU and 
NATO, 27 EUR. SEC. 374, 386 (2018). 
300 Cf. Steven Hill, Current International Law Challenges Facing NATO, NATO LEGAL GAZETTE, 
Issue 39, 5, at 9 (2019) (“NATO could be a natural venue for discussions about how international 
norms apply in the cyber area, not just in the military domain of operations but regarding broader 
issues relating to cyber defence”). 
301 See supra Section IV.B. 
454 
Harvard National Security Journal / Vol. 10 
sponsoring state also merits attention. Although many aspects of the rules 
governing the attribution of wrongful acts are settled, certain questions could 
benefit from a joint posture.302 NATO and EU nations should also strengthen their 
collective mechanisms for unmasking attempts at plausible deniability in order to 
deny its use as a hybrid instrument,303 as illustrated by their united response to the 
Skripal incident and to Russian cyber operations.304  
Rather than seek to harmonize divergent national positions, another option 
for increasing legal interoperability is to embrace and draw strength from their 
diversity. As is well known, the United States denies that a gap exists between the 
use of force and armed attack.305 On the U.S. view, any use of force against a state, 
regardless of its gravity, gives rise to the right to use necessary and proportionate 
force in self-defense. Stationing even small numbers of U.S. forces in the territory 
of the most vulnerable allied nations thus increases the chances that the United 
States could invoke its right of individual self-defense in circumstances where 
neither the host nation nor other Allies might be prepared to invoke Article 5.306 
Similarly, the greater the number of nations that expose their forces to the risk of 
direct attack by an adversary, the more likely it is that they will muster the political 
will to invoke Article 5 should they suffer an attack.307 This calls for highly 
multinationalized force structures. It should be emphasized that the function of 
national assets in these circumstances is not operational, but legal. Their primary 
role is not to defeat or deter an aggressor through military strength, but to serve as 
legal tripwires that threaten to increase the costs of aggression.308 
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The same tactic is available only to a more limited extent under Article 
42(7) TEU. Whereas any member state of NATO may invoke Article 5 NAT if its 
armed forces present in the territory of another NATO nation are subject to an 
armed attack,309 the geographical scope of application of Article 42(7) is limited to 
acts of armed aggression carried out against EU member states on their own 
territory. Consequently, where the forces of one EU member state suffer an attack 
in the territory of another member state, the former may invoke the right of 
individual self-defense, but not the mutual assistance commitment under Article 
42(7). There is room, however, for Article 42(7) to complement Article 5. Since the 
two provisions may apply at the same time,310 Article 42(7) could serve as a 
fallback solution for EU member states where there is no political appetite to rely 
on Article 5. Precisely because the EU is not a fully-fledged military alliance, 
invoking Article 42(7) instead of Article 5 may be seen as a less momentous 
decision, which could be more palatable in situations that are not of the utmost 
gravity.311 Seen in this light, Article 42(7) may be more readily available in 
response to more limited acts of aggression, such as temporary violations of 
national airspace or territory. However, even though Article 42(7) can no longer be 
dismissed as having no practical relevance following the Paris attack,312 its bilateral 
character is also its greatest weakness. At present, there are no standing 
arrangements in place to give teeth to the European mutual assistance commitment. 
Regardless of how successful NATO and the EU are in safeguarding Article 
5 NAT and Article 42(7) TEU from subversion, there is no escaping the fact that 
collective self-defense is not a suitable response to all hybrid threats. The drafters 
of the NAT were very much aware of this limitation. The Canadian Government, 
for example, held the firm view that the proposed treaty would not be effective if it 
did not offer guarantees against political and economic subversion, in addition to 
defending against armed attacks.313 George Kennan, then Director of the Policy 
Planning Staff at the U.S. State Department, cautioned against overestimating the 
significance of the NAT for similar reasons.314 For Kennan, the conclusion of a 
mutual defense pact would serve to deter overt Soviet aggression and also 
contribute to a general sense of security among the contracting parties, but it would 
not offer an answer to political warfare, which he considered to be the decisive and 
                                                 
309 NAT, supra note 1, art. 6. 
310 Steven Hill & David Lemétayer, NATO–EU Relations: An International Law Perspective, 11–
12 IRISH Y.B. OF INT’L L. 97, 101 (2016-2017). 
311 See Nanette Neuwahl, Cooperation under Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union in 
Reaction to the Paris Attacks, 21 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 5, 6 (2016). 
312 See, e.g., Sascha Dietrich, Die rechtlichen Grundlagen der Verteidigungspolitik der 
Europäischen Union, 66 HEIDELBERG J. OF INT’L. L. 663, 694 (2006).  
313 Memorandum by Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs (June 26, 1948), in 
DCER VOL. XIV, supra note 117, at 354, ¶ 12–14. In line with this position, Canada pushed strongly 
for establishing closer economic, political and cultural ties between the contracting parties. See JOHN 
C. MILLOY, THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION, 1948-1957: COMMUNITY OR 
ALLIANCE? 9–34 (2006). 
314 Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan) (Nov. 24, 1948), in FRUS 
VOL. III, supra note 22, at 283–84. 
456 
Harvard National Security Journal / Vol. 10 
more severe threat facing the West.315 Although subversion was thus recognized as 
a critical security challenge,316 attempts to address it in express terms ran into 
political objections and disagreements over how to define indirect aggression.317 
These attempts were therefore abandoned in favor of providing for a duty to enter 
into consultations in the event that any contracting party considered itself menaced 
by indirect aggression.318 Article 4 NAT thus stipulates that the parties “will consult 
together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political 
independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.” 
Taken together, Article 4 and 5 NAT cover the full spectrum of security 
challenges facing NATO nations. The scope of Article 4 is deliberately broad. It 
extends to any situation or event deemed to threaten the security of a contracting 
party,319 including subversive interference,320 in any part of the world.321 Article 4 
thus affords the Allies with an explicit treaty basis to consult each other in 
practically all circumstances where Article 5 has not been invoked or is not 
applicable.322 However, Article 4 entails no commitment to take any action beyond 
the duty to enter into consultations.323 Moreover, it envisages consultations in 
response to specific emergency situations and other matters of immediate 
importance.324 Like Article 5, it is a crisis response mechanism, rather than a 
framework for coordinating national policies on a continuing basis.325 Despite these 
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limitations, the importance of Article 4 lies in the fact that it provides NATO 
nations with a basis for countering hybrid threats falling below the threshold of an 
armed attack. Although so far formal reliance on Article 4 has been rare,326 making 
more frequent use of this procedure would offer two benefits.327 First, it would 
lessen the relevance of legal thresholds. If an adversary must expect a robust 
reaction in response to undertaking subversive acts below the level of an armed 
attack, then hybrid tactics designed to circumvent Article 5 become less effective 
and costlier to the aggressor. Second, an effective system of countermeasures under 
Article 4 would create a continuum between defensive action not involving the use 
of force at one end and collective self-defense under Article 5 at the other.328 This 
linkage would carry escalatory potential, which, in turn, would encourage 
adversaries to exercise restraint. Both of these factors would reinforce the deterrent 
effect of Article 5.329 
Compared to NATO, the EU has access to a far broader set of instruments 
for countering hybrid threats that fall below the threshold of an armed attack.330 
The security capabilities of the two organizations are thus complementary.331 As a 
result, Article 222 TFEU may complement Article 5 NAT and Article 42(7) TEU 
in two important respects. First, the breadth of the definition of terrorist attacks and 
man-made disasters renders Article 222 applicable in a wide range of 
circumstances. One of the recurring concerns voiced by security experts in this area 
is that hybrid adversaries may “weaponize” non-military means and domains, for 
example communication systems, energy supplies, or democratic political 
processes, to achieve warlike effects and outcomes.332 Such hostile activities may 
range from information operations to the disruption of critical infrastructure. At the 
lower end, most of these activities do not involve acts of violence or other direct 
physical effects. Accordingly, neither of the three mutual assistance clauses would 
be engaged.333 However, at the higher end, hostile acts may entail varying levels of 
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physical destruction and damage. For example, hybrid adversaries may attempt to 
disrupt critical transport facilities through acts of sabotage, thereby seeking to cause 
economic harm, disrupt supply chains, degrade military mobility, and tie up scarce 
resources. Unless such acts amount to an armed attack, Article 5 and Article 42(7) 
would not be engaged. However, acts of sabotage may qualify as terrorist attacks 
within the meaning of Article 222, for instance if they were to cause extensive 
destruction to a transport system, an infrastructure facility, or a public place or 
private property likely to endanger human life or result in major economic loss.334 
Article 222(2) thus provides the EU member states with a legal basis for assisting 
each other in response to acts of violence that do not cross the threshold of armed 
attack and for that reason do not trigger Article 5 and Article 42(7). 
Second, once engaged, Article 222 TFEU serves as a framework for 
mobilizing all the instruments at the Union’s disposal. Compared to Article 4 NAT, 
which merely provides for an ad hoc consultation process, the distinct advantage 
of Article 222 is that unlocks access to a wide variety of resources, instruments, 
and capabilities. These include, for example, the Union Civil Protection 
Mechanism designed to coordinate the EU’s response to disasters in Europe and 
further afield.335 The Mechanism consists of a pool of civil protection assets made 
available by the member states on a voluntary basis and an Emergency Response 
Coordination Centre, which serves as an operational hub for coordinating the EU’s 
disaster response. In 2018, the Mechanism mobilized more than 360 fire-fighting 
personnel, several aircraft and dozens of vehicles to assist the Swedish authorities 
in combating large-scale forest fires in their country.336 In 2016, the EU has 
complemented these arrangements by creating a legal framework for the provision 
of emergency support in response to exceptional disasters occurring inside the 
EU.337 The decision to activate this support is taken by the Council and may consist 
of humanitarian aid and other emergency measures, such as food assistance, 
emergency healthcare, shelter, water, sanitation and hygiene, protection, and 
education. Overall, the mobilization of capabilities under Article 222 can go some 
way towards countering the effects of hostile acts falling below the level of an 
armed attack. Building on recent efforts to deepen cooperation between NATO and 
the EU in the field of security,338 serious thought should be given to how actions 
under Article 4 and Article 222 could complement one another and thus reinforce 
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the deterrent effect of both Article 5 and Article 42(7). 
V. Conclusion   
This study has shown that the mutual assistance clauses of the North 
Atlantic and EU Treaties involve not just political commitments, as is often 
assumed, but distinct legal obligations. Their legally binding nature is precisely 
why they have endured over time—in the case of the NAT, for over seventy years—
against a backdrop of far-reaching changes in the international environment. The 
scope of the obligations they impose varies, however. Article 5 NAT and Article 
42(7) TEU are engaged in the same, or near identical, circumstances of an armed 
attack or an act of armed aggression. By contrast, the solidarity clause in Article 
222 TFEU is triggered by a terrorist attack or a natural or man-made disaster. 
Although this means that Article 222 may apply in a broader set of circumstances 
than Article 5 and Article 42(7), the fact that it is subject to a gravity threshold 
somewhat diminishes its utility. All three provisions envisage the use of both 
military and non-military forms of assistance. However, all three preserve, to 
varying degrees, the discretion of the assisting parties to choose the most 
appropriate means with which to discharge their duty of mutual assistance.339 
The Article has also shown that the hybridization of warfare poses 
substantial challenges to Article 5 NAT and Article 42(7) TEU. Both provisions 
are vulnerable to subversion as part of a hybrid way of strategic competition. By 
exploiting the legal thresholds and gray zones between war and peace, hybrid 
adversaries may conduct their operations in a manner that deliberately circumvents 
Article 5 and Article 42(7) or undermines the political will of their signatories to 
activate them. If successful, such tactics could preclude the two clauses from 
serving as a framework for countering aggression and thereby erode their deterrent 
effect. Against this background, it has become commonplace to lament the 
vulnerability of Article 5 and Article 42(7) to hybrid threats and to deplore the 
blurring of the dividing line between war and peace. This Article has demonstrated 
that these claims are inflated. They overlook the fact that the use of force in self-
defense is not a permissible or suitable response to all security challenges, whether 
hybrid or not. Nor does anything suggest that the pursuit of traditional military 
objectives no longer requires the use of armed force. Accordingly, the real risk to 
Article 5 and Article 42(7) arises from indirect forms of aggression and the 
combined use of armed force with non-military levers of influence in a way that 
circumvents the right of self-defense in situations where its exercise would be 
politically warranted, legally admissible, and militarily effective. 
The principal conclusion that flows from this analysis is that neither NATO 
nor the EU can afford to be complacent about the legal dimension of collective 
security. States use law and legal arguments as an instrument to pursue their 
strategic interests. NATO and the EU must therefore prepare for the prospect that 
adversaries actively seek to exploit legal gray areas and the legal vulnerabilities of 
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their funding instruments. However, contrary to what has been suggested by some 
commentators, it is not necessary to amend the NAT and EU Treaties to safeguard 
against this risk. Revising the treaties would not comprehensively resolve the 
challenges associated with the legal and political thresholds governing the 
applicability of Article 5 NAT, Article 42(7) TEU, and Article 222 TFEU. Instead, 
this Article has argued in favor of increasing legal interoperability among allied 
nations by relying on the existing legal frameworks. There are several strands to 
this task. They include narrowing legal gray zones, for example by reducing 
disagreements among the member states over the definition of armed attack, by 
collaborating to counteract attempts at plausible deniability, and by reinforcing 
legal tripwires, for instance in the form of highly multinationalized force structures. 
NATO nations should also consider making better use of Article 4 NAT, potentially 
linking it with Article 222 TFEU, in order to establish a continuum between 
measures not involving the use of armed force at one end and the exercise of the 
right of self-defense on the other. These measures would go some way towards 
rendering the mutual defense guarantees more resilient against subversion and thus 
would reinforce their deterrent effect in an age of hybrid warfare and multimodal 
geopolitical competition. 
 
